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THE RELIGION OF RACE:
THE SUPREME COURT AS PRIESTS OF RACIAL POLITICS
Audra L. Savage*
Abstract
The tumultuous summer of 2020 opened the eyes of many Americans,
leading to a general consensus on one issue—racism still exists. This
Article offers a new descriptive account of America’s history that can
contextualize the zeitgeist of racial politics. It argues that the Founding
Fathers created a national civil religion based on racism when they
compromised on the issue of slavery in the creation of the Constitution.
This religion, called the Religion of Race, is built on a belief system where
whiteness is sacred and Blackness is profane. The sacred text is the
Constitution, and it is interpreted by the Supreme Court who uses the
adjudication of cases as a ritual to advance this religion.
This Article argues that the Reconstruction Amendments and
attendant Civil Rights Acts can best be understood as an attempt by
Congress to end this Religion of Race and put all citizens on a path to
equality. The Supreme Court resisted this attempt, however, as evidenced
by cases adjudicated immediately following the Reconstruction period.
Thus, a contest ensued that has shaped American racial politics ever
since—whether the Supreme Court is interpreting the Constitution of
Slavery or the Constitution of Reconstruction and, therefore, whether it
will perpetuate or dismantle the Religion of Race.
INTRODUCTION
The summer of 2020 ushered in a national reckoning on race and racism
unparalleled in recent history. The protests and uprisings in the wake of the murder
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of George Floyd1 exposed the wounds of a troubled American history that refuses to
heal. More than ever before, people are questioning core democratic institutions and
traditions as they relate to race. A national conversation about the nature and role of
law enforcement, and its history rooted in slavery, began in earnest. There was
confusion over which Independence Day to celebrate—Juneteenth or the Fourth of
July. Monuments that at one time seemed permanent and immovable came tumbling
down, as they were seen as odes to white supremacy and no longer acceptable. As
the presidential election loomed large, there was an increased understanding of the
history of the Electoral College—also rooted in slavery—and a debate over its
continued use, as well as forceful calls to reenact key provisions of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 to protect against voter suppression. At the heart of this questioning,
and these (louder) calls for justice is one undeniable fact: racism still exists.
Racism in the United States harks back to the arrival of Africans in colonial
America and was integral in the founding of the nation.2 The Founding Fathers
compromised on the issue of slavery in the creation of the Constitution and, by doing
so, established the custom and tradition of subordinating Black people3 in American
law and society. Following the end of the Civil War, the Reconstruction Congress
focused on ending the “peculiar institution” and instituted constitutional
amendments and civil rights acts to end the vestiges of slavery and advance
citizenship rights and equal status of Blacks.4 In this sense, Congress attempted to
unwind the original Constitution’s racial subordination and promote a new goal of
equality.
This Article offers a new descriptive account of America’s racial history that
can helpfully highlight aspects of that history and contextualize the zeitgeist of racial
understanding and politics. It argues that the subordination of Black people instituted
by the Founders is more than just a notable consideration or an inquiry into the
country’s political commitments. Instead, the racism established by the Constitution
is an ideology—a set of basic beliefs and values—woven into the very soul of the
country by that foundational document. Indeed, the Founding Fathers created a
national civil religion based on racism when they compromised on the issue of
slavery. This religion, which I call the Religion of Race, is built on a belief system
1
Verdict, Count I–III, Minnesota v. Derek Michael Chauvin, (2021) (No. 27-CR-2012646).
2
See Audra L. Savage, Defining the True Meaning of Racism: The Law & Religion of
Colonial America, Parts I–III, CANOPY F. (Mar. 23, 2020), https://canopyforum.org/2020/03
/23/defining-the-true-meaning-of-racism-the-law-and-religion-of-colonial-america-part-1/
[https://perma.cc/V8A9-JCA4] (exploring the impact of law and Christianity on the
development of race and racism in colonial America).
3
I adopt the custom of capitalizing “Blacks” and “Black Americans” to denote them as
a separate racial group, as articulated by Kimberlé Crenshaw. See Kimberlé Williams
Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1332 n.2 (1988).
4
The African American Odyssey: A Quest for Full Citizenship, LIBR. OF CONG.,
https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/african-american-odyssey/reconstruction.html [https://perma.
cc/5T86-YKDU] (last visited May 11, 2021).

2021]

THE RELIGION OF RACE

571

in which whiteness is sacred, and Blackness is profane. The sacred text is the
Constitution, and it is interpreted by the Supreme Court who uses the adjudication
of cases as a ritual to advance this religion.
This Article argues that the Reconstruction Amendments and attendant Civil
Rights Acts can best be understood as an attempt by Congress to end this Religion
of Race and remove the boundary between whites and Blacks. However, this attempt
was resisted by the Supreme Court in the cases adjudicated immediately following
the Reconstruction period—notably The Civil Rights Cases of 1883 and Plessy v.
Ferguson of 1896. The Court’s decisions introduced a conflict that has shaped
American racial politics ever since—whether the Supreme Court is interpreting the
Constitution of Slavery or the Constitution of Reconstruction, and, therefore,
whether it will perpetuate or dismantle the Religion of Race.
This Article contributes to the field of Critical Race Theory by looking at the
dynamic of power and subordination of Black people through the lens of a
constitutionally established national civil religion built on racism.5 Critical Race
Theory is an area of legal scholarship directly examining and assessing the law’s
subordination of Black bodies and Black rights under the power of white privilege.6
Developing from the Critical Legal Studies movement around forty years ago,
Critical Race Theory questions whether the law is truly neutral and objective,
especially as it relates to race.7 It looks at ways in which race may, in fact, distort
legal doctrine and how law and legal traditions impact people of color—not as
individuals but as members of a group. By advancing the argument that the racism
established by the Founders is a national civil religion, this Article provides a new
narrative in the vein of Critical Race Theory about racial subordination and the
seemingly inexplicable inability of the law to fully eradicate racism in America.
5
This work focuses on the racism against Black Americans. This is not to ignore the
ugly history of racism against Native Americans, nor to deny their current plight that results
from that history. I believe that the enslavement of Black Americans is this country’s greatest
moral failing and is the reason why America has never truly met its potential. The words of
Thurgood Marshall in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke are notable on this
point: “The experience of Negroes in America has been different in kind, not just in degree,
from that of other ethnic groups. It is not merely the history of slavery alone but also that a
whole people were marked as inferior by the law. And that mark has endured.” 438 U.S. 265,
400 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting). But see Maggie Blackhawk, Federal Indian Law as
Paradigm Within Public Law, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1789 (2019) (“[A]rgu[ing] for a
more inclusive paradigm that reaches beyond the black/white binary” and “highlight[ing] the
centrality of federal Indian law . . .”).
6
See generally CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE
MOVEMENT (Kimberlé Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Pelloer & Kendall Thomas eds.,
1996); RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION
(2017); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic
eds., 3d ed. 2013); CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY
(Francisco Valdes, Jerome McCristal Culp & Angela Harris eds., 2002); and DOROTHY A.
BROWN, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS (3d ed. 2014).
7
DELGADO & STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 6,
at 8–11.
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The concept of a national civil religion describes the American experience of a
democratic political community shaped by, and sometimes against, religious
commitments and history. First postulated by French philosopher Jean-Jacques
Rousseau,8 it was developed by sociologist Robert Bellah in his seminal work, “Civil
Religion in America,” and in later works.9 Bellah argues that there is a “wellinstitutionalized civil religion” operating in parallel with the confessional religion of
the Christian church.10 There was never a state religion or a set of dogma for each
citizen to follow.11 Instead, Bellah calls the expression of certain beliefs, symbols,
and rituals of the American political reality the “American civil religion.”12
Furthermore, these beliefs, symbols, and rituals are related to “sacred things” and
are “institutionalized in a collectivity.”13 Although this religion is not Christianity,
Bellah argues that it derives from Christianity and the Founding Fathers’ belief that
the nation was directed by the will of a transcendent God, who held the ultimate
sovereignty of the state.14
According to Bellah, Americans believe there is a divine superstructure
overarching the nation, which has destined the country for greatness. Gary
Laderman expands on this idea about the centrality of God in the American civil
religion.15 He explains that the combination of “myths, rituals, morality, God, and
meaning” posited by Bellah drives American politics but operates under the public
radar.16 In other words, this divine superstructure is the silent operating system for
the nation. Turning the traditional notion of the separation between church and state
upside down and inside out, Laderman suggests that the American civil religion
“sheds a different light on the relationship between the sacred and the profane in the
political arena.”17

8
See generally JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: OR, THE
PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL RIGHTS 202–21 (Rose M. Harrington trans., The Knickerbocker
Press 1893) (1762) (introducing the term “civil religion” in his political musings). See
generally ROBERT N. BELLAH, Rousseau on Society and the Individual, in THE ROBERT
BELLAH READER 181–202 (Robert N. Bellah & Steven M. Tipton eds., 2006).
9
ROBERT N. BELLAH, Civil Religion in America, in THE ROBERT BELLAH READER,
supra note 8, at 225 [hereinafter BELLAH, Civil Religion]; ROBERT N. BELLAH, Religion and
the Legitimation of the American Republic, in THE ROBERT BELLAH READER, supra note 8,
at 246 [hereinafter BELLAH, Religion and the Legitimation]; and ROBERT N. BELLAH, THE
BROKEN COVENANT: AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION IN TIME OF TRIAL 4 (2d ed. 1992)
[hereinafter BELLAH, BROKEN COVENANT].
10
BELLAH, Civil Religion, supra note 9, at 225.
11
BELLAH, Religion and the Legitimation, supra note 9, at 248.
12
BELLAH, Civil Religion, supra note 9, at 228.
13
Id. at 233.
14
Id. at 228, 232.
15
See generally GARY LADERMAN, AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION (2012) (analysis of civil
religion as a force that continues to shape American society at the intersection of politics and
religion).
16
Id. at 26.
17
Id. at 27.
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A central feature of the civil religion is to serve as a tool of social solidarity.
Laderman argues the following:
[Civil religion] invigorates the social bonds uniting individual citizens into
a common social group and providing them with a shared sense of purpose
and meaning in the midst of historical experience and cultural diversity.
These are two key functions of American civil religion: to unite and to
orient.18
For Bellah, American society is unified by citizens who agree to subordinate the
nation to a set of ethical principles that transcend the nation itself.19
This Article argues that beyond the idea of a transcendent G/god as the core of
the American civil religion, race is the central, unifying, and orienting factor. Bellah
believes that the civil religion exerts pressure on the populace to find a solution to
the treatment of Black Americans, what he terms as “our greatest domestic
problem.”20 This Article advances a theory contrary to this assertion. The historical
treatment of Blacks is not a problem or issue. Instead, it is the core of American life
and American law.21 The Founding Fathers positioned the American political
structure along the axis of race—institutionalizing the ability of one group of people
to dominate another group and use that other group to create wealth.
When defining a national civil religion, both Robert Bellah and Gary Laderman
draw upon the foundational work of Émile Durkheim, a French sociologist and
leading founder of the field of sociology of religion.22 Durkheim’s contributions to
the concept of American civil religion are threefold. First, “[h]e too was concerned
with social structures and the question of collective coherence in modernity and
modern nations. Like Rousseau, Durkheim understood religion as an integral
ingredient for social solidarity. His definition of religion emphasized social realities
over theological beliefs.”23 Second, Durkheim posited that the definition of religion
contains two elements—the sacred and the profane.24 Further, and most importantly,
Durkheim transitioned the idea of religion as something experienced by an
individual as part of the collective into something experienced by the group.25

18

Id. at 32.
BELLAH, Civil Religion, supra note 9, at 226.
20
Id. at 241.
21
Bellah acknowledges the horrific treatment of Native Americans and Black
Americans at the founding of the nation as America’s “double crime.” BELLAH, BROKEN
COVENANT, supra note 9, at 37. See BELLAH, BROKEN COVENANT, supra note 9, at 36–60,
for Bellah’s discussion on slavery in the American experience.
22
See THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO DURKHEIM (Jeffrey C. Alexander and Philip
Smith eds., 2005). See generally ROBERT N. BELLAH, Durkheim and Ritual, in THE BELLAH
READER, supra note 8, at 150–80; LADERMAN, supra note 15, at 35–37.
23
LADERMAN, supra note 15, at 35.
24
Id.
25
BELLAH, Civil Religion, supra note 9, at 225–26.
19
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Durkheim’s construct is a useful analytical tool to describe the racial subordination
of Blacks in the law, and this Article focuses on the core concepts of this construct.
Part I describes the original Constitution as a proslavery compact by detailing
the debate over slavery in the Constitutional Convention and the compromises made
by the Founding Fathers, namely, the Three-Fifths Compromise, the Slave
Importation Clause, and the Fugitive Slave Clause. It then details key considerations
during the ratification process related to the status of Black people. I will call the
Constitution that was produced by the Founding Fathers, the Constitution of Slavery.
Using the construct of religion provided by Durkheim, Part II argues that the
Founding Fathers established a national civil religion I call the Religion of Race.
Each element of the Religion is described, including the authority (Constitution and
Supreme Court), beliefs (whiteness as sacred, Blackness as profane), and ritual
(adjudication of law). The section then illustrates the development of the Religion
of Race by examining case law in the period after the Constitution was created and
before the Civil War, including Grove, Prigg, Van Zandt, and Dred Scott.
Part III presents the Reconstruction Amendments and Civil Rights Acts as
shining a new light on the equality of Blacks contrary to the previous dogma of the
original Constitution. This new light I call the Constitution of Reconstruction. The
section then argues that the Supreme Court incorrectly narrowed the Reconstruction
Amendments and Acts and limited their application, leading to the unfulfilled
promise of equality for Blacks by creating the doctrine of “separate but equal.”
Part IV describes the promise of a new civil religion engendered by the
Constitution of Reconstruction and how the Court and Congress denied that promise.
The section then details the transition of the Religion of Race from a civil religion
to a dis/civil religion by the Supreme Court when it adopted the doctrine of state
action and sanctioned private discrimination.
I. THE CONSTITUTION OF SLAVERY
Racism was a custom, a cultural tradition of society against Native Americans
and Africans that took root on this continent in seventeenth-century British America.
It existed for a century before the American republic was founded. The drafting of
the U.S. Constitution did something new, however. It ensconced, encapsulated, and
established the custom and tradition of racism into American law by the Founders.
This section describes the debate over slavery in the Constitutional Convention
and the compromises made by the Founding Fathers. It then details key
considerations during the ratification process related to the status of Black
Americans.
A. The Debate and Compromise over Slavery
During the Enlightenment period of the eighteenth century, certain thinkers and
writers, like John Locke and Thomas Paine, began positing the doctrine of inherent
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human equality in American society.26 The idea of created equality was profoundly
influential to American revolutionaries as they began to articulate their grievances
against King George III.27 By his own testimony, Thomas Jefferson, in drafting the
Declaration of Independence, “appropriated” the ideas espoused by Locke.28 Using
these ideals, American colonists expressed the desire for freedom from a tyrannical
British monarchy that continued to levy burdensome taxes and other heavy
impositions on the colonists and did so without representation of the colonists in
Parliament.29 Once revolutionary ideals began to foment, many started to question
the legitimacy of slavery, especially as they were pressing for their freedom from
the Crown.30 The Revolution brought a division over the morality of slavery.31 For
some, it was further evidence of the evil of the monarchy. As revolutionaries,
Americans engaged in self-scrutiny as they began to define who they were and
whom they would become.32 Some wondered whether the nation would be cursed
because of its hypocrisy for enslaving Africans while claiming that the nation was a
land of liberty and equality.33
The tension between revolutionary ideals and the morality of slavery is best
exemplified by the varying thoughts and actions of the men who were instrumental
in drafting the documents that defined the nation—from the Declaration of
Independence to the Articles of Confederation to the U.S. Constitution. No two men
held the same opinion on the morality of slavery and the question of emancipating
American slaves.34 They held confused and often conflicting views on slavery.35
26

THOMAS S. KIDD, GOD OF LIBERTY: A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 138–40 (2010).
27
Prior to this time, the “doctrine of created inequality” was prevalent among the
seventeenth-century elites of America and Europe. According to this prevalent belief, God
created all humans to need God’s grace equally, but God made people in different stations
and situations in life. Id. People were unequal in their different capabilities and roles in
society. Id. at 132. The idea that all men [people] were created equal in value and talents was
profound at the time.
28
Id. at 139.
29
See KIDD, supra note 26, at 140.
30
Sally E. Hadden, The Fragmented Laws of Slavery in the Colonial and Revolutionary
Eras, in 1 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA: VOLUME 1 EARLY AMERICA
(1580–1815) 275 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008).
31
Id. at 255.
32
WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE
NEGRO, 1550–1812 269–311 (2d ed. 2012).
33
Id.
34
See DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN WESTERN CULTURE 170–72
(1966); KIDD, supra note 26, at 154–55. See also BENJAMIN RUSH, AN ADDRESS TO THE
INHABITANTS OF THE BRITISH SETTLEMENTS IN AMERICA, UPON SLAVE-KEEPING (2d ed.
1773).
35
Any discussion of the confusing, and at times, contradictory stances of the Founding
Fathers regarding slavery must begin with the ultimate scribe on equality—Thomas
Jefferson. It is no understatement to suggest that Jefferson offered the most baffling view on,
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This lack of consensus shaped the debate over the place of the institution in the new
nation.
With a wide set of attitudes regarding the morality, continued existence, and
legality of slavery, delegates of the thirteen colonies met in Philadelphia in the
summer of 1787 to transition the confederation of states into a lasting federal
government.36 The debate among delegates at the Constitutional Convention was
mostly between states interested in protecting the “peculiar institution” of slavery
and states that wanted to abolish it, or at least limit the power of Southern states
employing it.37 The result was a compromise that would ensure the longevity of
slavery for decades following.
Three key provisions of the Constitution directly protect, if not encourage, the
institution of slavery. The “Three-Fifths Compromise” allowed Southern states to
gain more political muscle by counting slaves in each state’s population, thereby

and life experience with, slavery. Throughout his lifetime, Jefferson expressed beliefs that
African slaves were innocent, inferior creatures whose enslavement should be avenged by
the Patriots against the British, yet later, he stated that slaves were devoid of beauty,
intelligence, or affection. They were worthy of serving as unpaid labor and concubinage, yet
such treatment would be avenged by God. As severe as this wrath might be, however, it was
of little or no concern to Jefferson, as he made very little effort to assuage God’s judgment
by emancipating his own slaves (including his children). See Hadden, supra note 30, at 275;
DAVIS, supra note 34, at 167–73; KIDD, supra note 26, at 146; Letter from Thomas Jefferson
to Jean Nicolas Deméunier (June 26, 1786), in 10 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 63 (Julian
Boyd ed., 1950); THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 138–39 (William
Peden ed., 2d ed. 1982).
James Madison and Patrick Henry also held contradictory views on slavery. Each
expressed moral repugnance and disgust at the institution and believed it was inconsistent
with the liberty espoused by the new republic. Yet, they refused to repudiate it and
emancipate their slaves, owing to their dependence on them and inability to live without
them. See KENNETH MORGAN, SLAVERY IN AMERICA: A READER AND GUIDE 135 (2005);
Letter from Patrick Henry to Robert Pleasants (Jan. 18, 1773), in THE FOUNDERS ON
RELIGION: A BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 99–100 (James H. Hutson ed., 2009).
One of the few Founders to emancipate his slaves was George Washington who, in his
will, mandated their freedom following his wife’s death. Washington made antislavery
professions but was cautious when lending his support to Quaker antislavery actions.
Further, he was indignant when antislavery advocates sought to bring his slaves under the
protection of Pennsylvania’s antislavery laws, and he sent his slaves back to Virginia to avoid
their liberation. Despite his attempts to protect ownership of his property, Washington often
wished to rid himself of the “very troublesome species of property” and eventually did so,
but only upon his death. KIDD, supra note 26, at 155; Letter from George Washington to
Alexander Spotswood (Nov. 23, 1794), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washing
ton/05-17-02-0136 [https://perma.cc/T9EG-NCYV].
36
PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF
JEFFERSON 7 (1996) [hereinafter FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS].
37
The phrase “peculiar institution” is attributed to Kenneth M. Stampp and his seminal
work, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH (1956).
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gaining more representatives in the House of Representatives than would be the case
if only whites were counted.38 This provision reads as follows:
Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several
states which may be included within this union, according to their
respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole
number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of
years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.39
Essentially, this provision mandates the counting of slaves—“all other persons”—
as three-fifths of a person for the purposes of determining the number of
representatives and the taxes allotted to each state. Whites, even those who were
indentured, will be counted as a whole; slaves as a specified fraction; and Native
Americans not at all.
No clause demonstrated the compromises on slavery more than Article I,
Section 9, clause 1, related to the international slave trade. This “Slave Importation
Clause” prevents Congress from ending the slave trade before 1808, although it does
not require Congress to ban the slave trade after that date.40 This clause provides
that:
The migration or importation of such persons as any of the states now
existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress
prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a tax or duty
may be imposed on such importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each
person.41
This provision is not self-enacting—the slave trade was not automatically terminated
in 1808. Instead, Congress has to affirmatively create legislation to end the trade.42
This provision is notable because it was a major exception to the general power
granted to Congress to regulate commerce.43
Article IV, Section 2, clause 3, the “Fugitive Slave Clause,” requires states to
return runaway slaves to their owners on claim and prevents states from
emancipating the slaves:
No person held to service or labor in one state, under the laws thereof,
escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation

38

FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS, supra note 36, at 7–18.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
40
FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS, supra note 36, at 4.
41
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
42
Congress terminated U.S. participation in the international slave trade in 1807, with
the law taking effect on January 1, 1808. See JORDAN, supra note 32, at 7, 331.
43
FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS, supra note 36, at 4.
39
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therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up
on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due.44
This was a major win for the Southern states, as there had never been an affirmative
duty of non-slave-owning states to return runaway slaves before this provision. The
practice of capturing and returning runaway servants and slaves existed before the
Constitutional Convention as agreements between the various colonies.45 It was a
matter of comity among states.46 Now, all states were obligated to incur the cost of
time and money in returning runaway slaves to their owners.47
Two ancillary provisions are related to the three above. Article I, Section 9,
clause 4, states that any capitation or direct tax must take into account the ThreeFifths Compromise. If there should be any head tax, then slaves will count threefifths of whites. Article V prohibits any amendment to either the Slave Importation
Clause or the capitation tax clauses before 1808.
Other provisions of the Constitution indirectly support the institution of
slavery.48 The Domestic Insurrections Clause (Article I, Section 8, clause 15)
allowed Congress to call the militia to “suppress insurrections,” which ostensibly
included slave rebellions, and the federal government promised to protect states
against “domestic violence,” including slave rebellions, in Article IV, Section 4.
Certain provisions (Article I, Section 9, clause 5 and Article I, Section 10, clause 2)
prohibited the federal government from excising taxes on goods imported or
exported by any state. This prevented an indirect tax on goods produced from the
fruits of slave labor, notably tobacco, rice, and cotton. Further, the Electoral College
was created, in part, to ensure that the Southern states had voting rights equal to the
North. As such, the same three-fifths formula used elsewhere in the Constitution was
used in Article II, Section 1, clause 2, establishing the Electoral College. It gave
whites in slave states disproportionate influence in the election of the President.
44

U.S. CONST. art. IV, §2, cl. 3.
WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
AMERICA, 1760–1848 78 (1977).
46
Id.
47
See id. Slave patrols were a common feature of the peculiar institution, as they were
assembled by plantation owners to patrol at night looking for slaves who were off-plantation
and possibly attempting escape. These patrols gained more power and force under the
auspices of the fugitive slave laws created pursuant to the Fugitive Slave Clause, and were
the progenitors of the modern police force. See Eleanor Lumsden, How Much Is Police
Brutality Costing America?, 40 UNIV. OF HAW. L. REV. 141, 146 (2017) (“Over time, these
slave patrols eventually morphed into a form that is now recognized as modern-day law
enforcement: ‘[t]he slave patrol, which began as an offshoot of the militia, and came to
resemble the modern police, thus provides a transitional model in the development of
policing.’ It can be argued that from the beginning, law enforcement existed to control, not
protect, blacks. Further, as African-Americans were literal property, policing that returned
runaway slaves to their masters directly served the purpose of maintaining white property
interests.”) (footnote omitted).
48
See Paul Finkelman, The Centrality of the Peculiar Institution in American Legal
Development, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1009, 1030–31 (1993).
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Other clauses protecting slavery included the clause on the admission of new states
(Article IV, Section 3, clause 1), which was drafted in anticipation of adding new
slave states to the Union, and the clause on ratifying the Constitution (Article V),
which was drafted to ensure that slaveholding states would have a perpetual veto
over any constitutional changes.49
B. Ratification
Drafting the Constitution was only the first part of the constitutional process.
The second part required the delegates to return to their home states with the draft
document and present it to their fellow citizens for ratification.50 It would take a year
for the Constitution to be ratified by the required number of states.51 The debate
notes, letters, pamphlets, and other writings during this time offer a deeper
understanding of the meaning of the three major provisions regarding slavery and
the perceived consequences of these provisions becoming law.52 Four major themes
are prevalent in these documents.
The most dominant theme is the status of slaves as both property and people,
and, as property, their inclusion in the same category as plantation animals. For some
delegates, the slave counted merely as property, and thus other property should be
included in the count for representation and taxation purposes, or at least for taxation
only.53 Other delegates noted that slaves are both property and persons under law.54
The slave laws allowed the slave to be vendible as property while also protecting the
slave against harm and preventing slaves from harming others as persons.55 This
duality of character is bestowed by law, and, therefore, some believed it should be
reflected in the Constitution.56
Another theme regarding the place of Blacks in American society focused on
the importance of a truly representative government. Some opposed the Three-Fifths
49

FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS, supra note 36, at 3–7.
See Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Records of the State Ratifying
Conventions as a Source of the Original Meaning of the U.S. Constitution, 2009 U. ILL. L.
REV. 457, 466–68 (2009).
51
Id.
52
See generally THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, VOLS. 2–4 (Philip B. Kurland &
Ralph Lerner eds., 2000), https://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/help/about.html
[https://perma.cc/BDM6-R2KF] (explaining the anthology “draw[s] on the writings of a
wide array of people . . . . from the reflections of philosophers to popular pamphlets, from
public debates in ratifying conventions to the private correspondence of the leading political
actors of the day.”).
53
See Letter from a Gentleman from Massachusetts (Oct. 17, 1787), in 2 THE
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 114 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 2000) [hereinafter
2 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION].
54
See James Madison, Federalist, No. 54 (Feb. 12, 1788), in 2 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at 126.
55
Id.
56
Id.
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Compromise because of the lack of rights granted to slaves in order for them to
participate in government.57
The third theme centered on the tension between a new nation founded upon
the ideals of liberty and equality and the creation of a constitution sanctioning human
bondage. The tension was based either on political views about America as a nation
of equality58 or religious views about America as God’s nation.59
The fourth theme arising in the debates concerned the slave trade and confusion
over the place of slavery in the nation. Some assumed that the trade would be
prohibited once the twenty-year ban expired because slavery was a failing institution
whose demise had already begun.60 Others, however, felt that Americans would
never give up their slaves, and thus Congress would not enact a ban once it was
permitted to do so.61 The debate also showed a nascent states’ rights argument for
the continuation of slavery.62 By drafting this provision in the manner they chose,
the Founders did not answer whether there should be a ban on the slave trade as part

57
See Brutus, No. 3 (Nov. 15, 1787), in 2 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note
53, at 115; Luther Martin, Genuine Information (1788), in 2 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION,
supra note 53, at 120; see also A Republican Federalist, No. 5 (Jan. 19, 1788), in 2 THE
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at 126.
58
See Debate in Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 15, 1788) [Elliot], in 3 THE
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 292 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 2000) [hereinafter
3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION]; Tench Coxe, An Examination of the Constitution (Fall
1787), in 3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION. at 282; Luther Martin, Genuine Information
(1788), in 3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, at 285; Debate in MA Ratifying Convention
(Jan. 18, 25–26, 30, 1788) [Elliot], in 3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, at 288.
59
See A Countryman (Dec. 13, 1787), in 3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note
58, at 284; Joshua Atherton, New Hampshire Ratifying Convention (1788) [Elliot], in 3 THE
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 58, at 286; Luther Martin, Genuine Information
(1788), in 3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 58, at 285. But see Debate in
Massachusetts Ratifying Convention (Jan. 17–19, 1788) [Elliot], in 2 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at 288; James Madison, Federalist, No. 42 (Jan. 22, 1788),
in 3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 58, at 289; and Debate in South Carolina
House of Representatives (Jan. 16–17, 1788) [Elliot], in 3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION,
supra note 58, at 287 (rejecting the idea that slavery is against God’s will).
60
See Debate in Massachusetts Ratifying Convention (Jan. 17–19, 1788) [Elliot], in 2
THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at 123; James Madison, Federalist, No. 42
(Jan. 22, 1788), in 3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 58, at 289; and Debate in
VA Ratifying Convention (June 15, 1788) [Elliot], in 3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION,
supra note 58, at 292.
61
See Luther Martin, Genuine Information (1788), in 3 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION, supra note 58, at 286; Debate in Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 15,
1788) [Elliot], in 3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 58, at 292–94.
62
See Debate in South Carolina House of Representatives (Jan. 16–17, 1788) [Elliot],
in 3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 58, at 287, and A Federal Republican (Oct.
28, 1787), in 3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 58, at 282.
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of the ideals of the country as embedded in the Constitution. Instead, they deferred
the conflict to the future for others to resolve.63
Ultimately, the advocates in favor of the three provisions regarding slavery had
the winning argument, and the Constitution was ratified as drafted. The Founders
compromised on various issues regarding slavery, and in the end, the Constitution
was a proslavery compact.64
Lawrence M. Friedman says a constitution is generally “in essence a frame, a
skeleton, an outline of the form of government; it mostly held its tongue on
specifics.”65 Perhaps the Constitution did not give many specifics, but it did not hold
its tongue on slavery. That lack of restraint established several principles of racist
attitudes toward Black people in this country. The Constitution could have been
silent on the matter of slavery and let custom and tradition be the arbiter of how and
in which state it continued. Writing it into the legal document, however, sealed the
country’s understanding of Blacks and legitimated racist attitudes. Race became one
of the core features of how the new nation defined itself. For this reason, I call the
Constitution the Constitution of Slavery.
The next section details the effect of the Founders’ compromise on slavery and
argues that the Founders established racist beliefs towards Blacks into something
more than a social phenomenon. They established racism as the national civil
religion.
II. THE RELIGION OF RACE
A. Defining the Religion
The Constitution contains the Founders’ understanding and experience of law
and custom as they had developed over two centuries of early American life. The
words reflect their thoughts and ideas about certain concepts. Their individual
experiences are incorporated. When constitutional scholars debate the legitimacy of
certain ideals and principles based on whether they are in accordance with the
original intent of the Founders, they are probing the public understanding of laws
and words in eighteenth-century America to better understand the application of the
constitutional provision to modern law. The underlying assumption is that the words
have value, and that value continues to endure. This means that the impressions of
the Founders continue to have a lasting impact.
In addition to probing into the thoughts and actions of the Founders to consider
the meaning of the words and concepts in the Constitution, one need only review the
words in the Constitution itself to fully understand what the Founders hoped to
63

A Federal Republican (Oct. 28, 1787), in 3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra
note 58, at 282–94.
64
See FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS, supra note 36, at 31–33; see also
Paul Finkelman, Lincoln v. the Proslavery Constitution: How a Railroad Lawyer’s
Constitutional Theory Made Him the Great Emancipator, 47 ST. MARY’S L. J. 63, 67 (2015)
[hereinafter Finkelman, Lincoln v. the Proslavery Constitution].
65
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 103 (2005).
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achieve. The Constitution was meant to be the best possible way to develop a society
of people united in the pursuit of justice and promoting their best welfare. According
to the Preamble, the provisions of the Constitution ensure the most attainable version
of liberty. The Founders’ version of liberty and justice, however, contained
provisions regarding the enslavement of a whole class of people—Black people. By
drafting the provisions of the Constitution regarding slavery in the manner they did,
the Founders fixed the practice of slavery into American culture and created guiding
principles for how the country would think of Blacks, not only then but now.
Religion is a mechanism for ordering one’s life and deciphering the ultimate
meaning of life. The Founders ordered American life in a very specific way when
creating the Constitution. Sanford Levinson observes, “the public rhetoric of
American political culture remains organized, in substantial ways, as a faith
community centered on the Constitution . . . .”66 He continues by saying that the
American civil religion is a “web of understandings, myths, symbols, and documents
out of which would be woven interpretive narratives both placing within history and
normatively justifying the . . . American community . . . .”67 Racism is the core
narrative defining the civil religion. This ordering of life in the U.S., where race is a
distinguishing fact that privileges white people by denigrating Black people, is
America’s true national religion.
The Religion of Race is the American civil religion. In this religion, whiteness
is sacred, and Blackness is profane. Following in the footsteps of Bellah and
Laderman,68 I use the work of Émile Durkheim to describe the Religion of Race and
its development as America’s true civil religion.
Durkheim provided the following construct for religion:
A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred
things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden—beliefs and practices
which unite in one single moral community called a Church, all those who
adhere to them . . . religion must be an eminently collective thing.69
Religion, then, has three main components: (1) authority that defines the sacred and
provides directives for religious practices; (2) beliefs about the sacred and the
profane; and (3) rituals as ceremonies that elevate the sacred and reinforce a
worldview for the believers.70 The Religion of Race comprises these components,
which are described in detail below.71
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SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 52 (2011).
Id. at 10.
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See supra Introduction.
69
ÉMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE 44–47 (Karen E.
Fields trans., 1995).
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See id. at 34–44.
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1. Authority
Authority is a necessary component of religion. Anthropologist Clifford Geertz
suggests that religious belief is more than mere observation of everyday
experiences.72 Instead, it is a “prior acceptance of authority which transforms” the
everyday experience.73 This authority, which can reside in texts or people, defines
what is to be worshiped as sacred and then defines the religious practices related to
the sacred. As such, rituals can be performed only by “consecrated personages.”74
“There are words, phrases, and formulas that can be said only by consecrated
personages; there are gestures and movements that cannot be executed by just
anyone.”75 They are executed by those chosen by the group to have persuasive
authority. The authority of the Religion of Race resides in a sacred text, the
Constitution, and consecrated people, the Supreme Court.76 Both forms of authority
are discussed below.
(a) Authority of Text—The Constitution
The leading authority for the Religion of Race is the Constitution. As the oldest
operating constitution in the world, the American Constitution has been venerated
as a sacred document since its creation. According to President Woodrow Wilson,
the Constitution became the object of “blind worship” almost instantly.77 Bellah
refers to the Constitution (as well as the Declaration of Independence) as “sacred
scriptures.”78 The original copy of the Constitution is housed in the National
Archives in what is called the “Shrine.”79 More important, early in the country’s
history, the Supreme Court referred to it as “sacred.”80 There is universal acceptance
of the Constitution as the authority for the rule of law in this country.
As important as it is for external sources to refer to its authority, the reasons the
Constitution is the persuasive authority of the Religion of Race are inherent in the
72

CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES: SELECTED ESSAYS 109–12
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Id.
DURKHEIM, supra note 69, at 35.
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Id.
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It is possible for authority to reside in extralegal sources, such as academics, activists,
businesses, or others who shape law and policy. I will explore this type of authority in future
work.
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HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 198 (1963) (quoting Woodrow Wilson).
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ROBERT N. BELLAH, BEYOND BELIEF: ESSAYS ON RELIGION IN A POST-TRADITIONAL
WORLD 176 (1991) [hereinafter BELLAH, BEYOND BELIEF]. See also Thomas C. Grey, The
Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1, 23 (1984).
79
PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE ix (1st ed. 1997).
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See Jackson v. Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. 296, 307 (1858) (Daniel, J., dissenting)
(“regarded . . . as the sacred authority of the Constitution”); Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith,
100 U.S. 514, 529 (1879) (“Contracts under the Constitution are as sacred as the Constitution
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nature of the Constitution itself. As a self-proclaimed compact among the people, it
replaced the God of the Declaration of Independence with the god of the demos. The
Declaration announced the colonies’ formal separation from the king of Great
Britain and their intent to govern themselves, all under the auspices of divine
direction and guidance.81 Bellah notes that there are four references to God in the
Declaration, including the famous (and at times infamous) statement that all men
“are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are
Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”82 Jefferson calls upon higher law to
legitimate the separation and creation of a new nation.83 The Declaration also
includes references to the “Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God”; “the Supreme
Judge of the World for the rectitude of our intentions”; and “a firm reliance on the
protection of divine Providence.”84 This direct appeal to divine providence and
guidance was not repeated in the Constitution, which was drafted just eleven years
later.85 Instead, the Constitutions states,
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union,
establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common
defence [sic], promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of
Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this
Constitution for the United States of America.86
Clearly, it is the “people” who ordain the creation of this document to form the union
of the states and provide for its security going forward. Unlike the Declaration of
Independence, the Constitution does not claim any transcendent spiritual authority
higher than itself.87 This is significant, as the Declaration was backward-looking in
its termination of the rule of the previous regime, whereas the Constitution was
forward-looking with the objective of establishing principles to guide the new
nation.88 These principles would be determined by the people. In this way, the
Constitution was an agreement among the people—a true social compact. Robert
Cover suggests that its status as a Lockean social contract is why the Constitution
elicited such fidelity from the men of the 1780s and 1790s.89
81
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The Constitution is the moral authority of the nation. Bellah likens the founding
of the nation to the Israelites search for the Promised Land.90 Extending the
metaphor, the Constitution represents a moral commitment of the covenant people
to order their lives by the highest standards.91 Cover suggests that its moral authority
transcends its status as the supreme law of the land. Its authority arises from the very
origins of the Constitution and its utility as a real social compact brought to life for
the first time.92 People adhere to its rules because it sets forth a government without
coercion, where men have come to mutually depend on that agreement.93 There is
no king or pope using power and the threat of violence to command obedience.
Instead, it is just the people contracting among themselves, and thus they have a
moral obligation to obey their mutual agreement.94
The Constitution is a sacred text not only because it has moral authority as a
social compact but also because it speaks to its importance as the preeminent guide
for the nation. Clause 2 of Article VI, referred to as the Supremacy Clause, states
the following:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby; any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.95
The Constitution enumerates certain powers and rights for the branches of
government, the states, and the people. By declaring itself the “supreme Law of the
Land,” it explicitly places itself above any other laws or rules. This is confirmed by
the Tenth Amendment, which notes that any power not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution is reserved to the states or to the people.96 While ensuring
state sovereignty, this amendment supports the supremacy of the Constitution—the
first inquiry is always whether the Constitution addresses a particular power or law;
if not, then state law has authority.
The use of the word “supreme” is significant. A universal etymological English
dictionary in use in the eighteenth century defines “supreme” as “advanced to the
highest Degree of Authority or Dignity,” and “supremacy” as “the most transcendent
Height of Power and Authority, more especially the Supreme or chief power of the
King or Queen of England, in Ecclesiastical Affairs.”97 The religious aspect of this
90
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word is demonstrated in the Declaration of Independence when the colonists appeal
for assistance to the “Supreme Judge of the world” (meaning God).98 By declaring
itself to be the “supreme Law of the Land,” the Constitution declares that it is equal
to God as the highest authority for guidance and direction.
The acceptance of this authority was consecrated by the ratification process,
through which the people agreed that the Constitution would be the highest moral
authority for the new nation. Through that process, “the people” were able to debate
and understand the meaning of the provisions.99 It took a year of meetings, pamphlet
publications, and fierce exchange among the populace before the Constitution was
accepted by the required number of states.100 It was also quickly amended by the
addition of the Bill of Rights, further safeguarding individual liberties.101 This time
of ratification and amending was a trial by fire, ensuring that the social compact met
the needs of the new nation.
(b) Authority of People—The Supreme Court
Judges and the Supreme Court are consecrated personages in the Religion of
Race. According to Article III of the Constitution, judicial power is vested in one
“supreme court” and such inferior courts as needed, as ordained and established by
Congress.102 The courts will have judges exhibiting good behavior with
compensation for their services.103 Article III establishes two things. First, there will
be a hierarchy of courts, with a bottom-rung consisting of courts of first appearance
followed by a higher-level Supreme Court. The Supreme Court is the only final
tribunal for controversies and challenges under the Constitution.104 Whether it
decides cases under original jurisdiction or appellate jurisdiction, the decisions of
the Supreme Court are the final word on a particular matter. There is no higher
appeal. Second, judges are the chosen people to interpret and explain the
Constitution. Like priests, they spend years studying the sacred text and are called
upon to provide exegesis105 on its ultimate meaning. Judges, and the lawyers arguing
98
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the cases before the Court, have the authority and responsibility to preserve the
sanctity of the venerated document.
The supremacy and finality of the Supreme Court were confirmed relatively
soon after the creation of the Constitution in Marbury v. Madison.106 In that decision,
the Court said the principles established by the people in the Constitution are
fundamental and the supreme authority.107 One such principle was the creation of
different departments of the government, one of them being the judiciary. It is the
“province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”108 In doing so,
the Court must be cognizant that “the Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of
the legislature. . . .”109 The Court acknowledged that the Constitution declares its
own supremacy and that the courts are “bound by that instrument.”110
The Constitution prescribes the manner in which judges will be consecrated.
Article VI, clause 3, states that the judicial officers of the United States shall be
bound by an oath or affirmation to support the Constitution.111 Judges take this oath
when they are sworn into office for the first time. In this way, the act of taking the
oath converts a chosen person from lawyer to judge, whose responsibility it is not
only to obey the Constitution but also to interpret and proclaim its meaning. The
public acknowledges the exalted position of the judge in the routine ceremonies
reenacted daily in the courtroom. All in attendance must stand upon entry of the
judge or judges, whose entrance is announced by a designated person (for instance,
“oyez, oyez, oyez” or “all rise”). In this gesture, the parties and the visitors
acknowledge that the judge is L/lord of the proceedings. Indeed, the parties present
their pleas for relief to the court in the form of “prayers.” The courtroom is a
sanctuary, and the judge its high priest.
2. Beliefs
Durkheim states that people conceive two separate classifications for beliefs,
whether real or ideal: the sacred and the profane.112 “Beliefs, myths, dogmas, and
106
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legends are either representations or systems of representations that express the
nature of sacred things, the virtues and powers attributed to them, their history, and
their relationships with one another as well as with profane things.”113 Sacred things
are not limited to gods or spirits—they can be anything that people endow with value
and protect from things not sacred. The profane is anything that threatens the sacred;
prohibitions must be applied to the profane, and the sacred must be protected from
it.114 There is a sense that the profane can contaminate or damage the sacred. The
sacred is superior in dignity and power to profane things.115 The difference between
the sacred and the profane is absolute. A void separates them, with no mingling
possible.116 They are hostile and jealous rivals—two worlds with nothing in
common.117 This rivalry is “expressed outwardly by a visible sign that permits ready
recognition of this classification, wherever it exists.”118
By compromising on the issue of slavery in the Constitution, the Founders
established the belief system of the Religion of Race. In essence, they sacralized
whiteness and made Blackness profane.119 The Constitution ordains the preferential
treatment of whites over Blacks with the provisions maintaining and supporting
Black subjugation, namely the Three-Fifths Compromise, the Slave Importation
Clause, and the Fugitive Slave Clause, as well as the various supplemental
provisions supporting these clauses or preventing the amendment of them.120
Further, the Tenth Amendment, adopted in 1791, “reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people” the powers not delegated to the national government
by the Constitution “nor prohibited by it to the States. . . .”121 As such, the
Constitution affirmed the definition of slaves as property and persons under the
various state slave codes. Taken together, these provisions established Black people
as less than human beings, not deserving of the same treatment and rights as white
people, with whites exercising control over the mind, body, and soul of Black
people. Blacks are to be used for the economic success of other people and sacrificed
for the wealth of the nation.
The overarching goal of creating the Constitution was the creation of a new
nation. The new nation was desirable for economic benefits and defense against
foreign enemies. The debates during the Constitutional Convention show how the
northern delegates valued the possible wealth of the new nation over their own
113
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ideals, which argued against slavery.122 The discussions during the ratification
debate also demonstrate that the state leaders were aware that they were trading on
the principles of the new republic in order to achieve the goal of nationhood.123 They
were sacrificing the liberty and equality of Blacks to ensure the success of the new
nation.124 The representatives from South Carolina explicitly stated that without
slaves, the state would falter.125 They needed Blacks to achieve their goals. Other
delegates noted their own discomfort and outright repugnance with slavery but were
willing to live with the hypocrisy in order to form a national government.126 The
delegates were also willing to risk the wrath of God for the promise of untold
wealth.127 Blacks were condemned as property to benefit the economy of the nation
and, by extension, the wealth of whites.
Blacks were so debased that they were not mentioned by name in the
Constitution. It does not use the word “slave” or “slavery” in any of its provisions.
The words were avoided to make the document more agreeable to delegates from
northern states.128 Or, as James Iredell said at the ratifying convention, “the word
slave is not mentioned . . . owing to the [northern delegates’] particular scruples on
the subject of slavery.”129 This type of circumlocution is evident in the Three-Fifths
Compromise, where slaves are referred to as “all other persons.”130 This euphemism
continues in the Slave Importation Clause, which refers to slaves and the slave trade
as “The Migration or Importation of such Persons.”131 The Fugitive Slave Clause
refers to slaves as a “Person held to Service or Labour in one State.”132 The use of
other words and phrases as euphemisms for slavery was a way for the southern
delegates to appease their counterparts in order to receive the protection of slavery
they sought.133 Essentially, the Founders, who may have had qualms about the
institution, accepted the oppression of Blacks as long as what was written in law did
not directly support the oppression (that is, as long as it sounded good on paper). As
Luther Martin stated, the drafters used language to avoid words “odious to the ears
of Americans,” although they were willing to allow the acts.134 This practice created

122

WIECEK, supra note 45, at 73.
See supra Part I.B.
124
Id.
125
Debate in South Carolina House of Representatives (Jan. 16–17, 1788) [Elliot], in
3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 58, at 287.
126
See supra Part I.B; supra note 35 and accompanying text.
127
See supra Part I.
128
FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS, supra note 36, at 3.
129
James Iredell, Ratifying Convention (July 29, 1788) [Elliot], in 4 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION 526 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 2000).
130
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
131
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
132
U.S. CONST. art. IV, §2, cl. 3.
133
FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS, supra note 36, at 3.
134
Luther Martin, Genuine Information (1788), in 3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION,
supra note 58, at 285.
123

590

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 3

dangerous precedence for Americans to accept the suppression and subordination of
Black people as long as the subordination did not sound as bad as it was in reality.
Whiteness is sacred because whiteness means freedom. As Professor Cheryl
Harris states, “[w]hiteness was the characteristic, the attribute, the property of free
human beings . . . .”135 As the Three-Fifths Compromise makes clear, in America,
there are “free persons” and “all other persons.”136 In other words, there are whites
who are free and Blacks who are not. These are the polar constructs of “slave” and
“free,” “Black” and “white.”137 Harris continues: “white identity and whiteness were
sources of privilege and protection; their absence meant being the object of
property.”138 Whiteness means the exclusion and subordination of Blacks.139
Further, as Neil Gotanda notes, “Black is the reification of subordination; white is
the reification of privilege and super-ordination.”140 Under the Durkheim construct,
the sacred is superior in dignity and power to profane things.141 This precisely
describes the nature of the relationship of whites and Blacks established by the
Constitution, where whites are superior to Blacks. Whiteness is valuable because it
confers citizenship and status as full human beings, which is denied to others.142
Slaves were chattel property, and thus the mind, body, and soul of the Black
person were controlled to protect the sacredness of whiteness from contamination
by Black skin and Black blood.143 As mentioned above, the Tenth Amendment
reserved to the states or to the people any powers not delegated to the national
government by the Constitution or prohibited by it to the states.144 The slave codes
existing when the Constitution was drafted and ratified covered all manner of daily
life for the slave and created a regulated society between whites and Blacks. In fact,
the bulk of legislative acts or codes regarding slavery dealt not with the legal status
of the slave but with the regulation of the rights of Blacks, the noncriminal policing
of Blacks, and the law of slave crimes.145 The codes covered not only slaves but all
Black persons, who posed a perceived threat to the “purity and safety of whites.”146
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Few codes outlined the positive rights of slaves,147 but many negatively or at least
indirectly secured the rights of slaves.148 The laws proscribed cruel and inhumane
treatment of slaves and mandated a bare minimum of clothing and food for them.149
No aspect of life was too mundane for the notice of the law. Slave codes governed
the sexuality of slaves, especially if white lovers were involved;150 the ability of
slaves to hire themselves out to third parties for wages;151 the ownership of horses,
cattle, sheep, and crops;152 the ability of slaves to read or write;153 and the type of
clothing slaves were allowed to wear.154 Laws also proscribed the participation of
Blacks in the militia and military service and the use of their testimonies in court.155
Natural law is a set of principles based on the idea of natural rights possessed
by people apart from the rights given to them by government or laws.156 Contrary to
natural law, positive law is law explicitly acknowledging or defining rights.157 The
language of the Declaration of Independence discussed in Part I above illustrates
this distinction. The notion that all men have certain unalienable rights “endowed by
their Creator” is an acknowledgment of natural law. These rights represent the power
that a man has over himself. Such power emanates from a deity or from nature. On
the contrary, the Constitution makes the allocation of power explicit and is positive
law.158 It specifies the consensual ordering of power among men within a society.
Each person sacrifices some of their natural law rights to form the social compact
and has an obligation to the social order. The Constitution is a tangible expression
147

For example, in South Carolina’s code of 1740 and Georgia’s derivative code of
1755, Blacks could bring suit to test the legality of their enslavement. Wiecek, Statutory Law,
supra note 143, at 265.
148
Id.
149
The effectiveness of anticruelty laws is questionable, however, as statutes and judges
were predisposed to assume that an owner would not willfully damage his own property (it
would not make sense to damage a capital investment). Id. at 265–67.
150
See Gotanda, supra note 119, at 6 (“The ‘one drop of blood’ rule typifies this stigma:
Any trace of African ancestry makes one Black. In contrast, the classification white signifies
‘uncontaminated’ European ancestry and corresponding racial purity.”) See also Kevin D.
Brown, The Rise and Fall of the One-Drop Rule: How the Importance of Color Came to
Eclipse Race, in COLOR MATTERS: SKIN TONE BIAS AND THE MYTH OF A POSTRACIAL
AMERICA 44 (Kimberly Jade Norwood ed., 2013) (discussing the social and legal distinctions
between Black and white in the United States, including in regards to intermarriage and
sexual relations).
151
Wiecek, Statutory Law, supra note 143, at 267.
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
Id. at 268.
155
Id. at 268–69.
156
COVER, supra note 89, at 10.
157
See generally WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
38–63 (providing a treatise on the common law of England on the rights of persons, the rights
of things, of private wrongs and of public wrongs, which has proven to be an indispensable
tool for American jurists and lawyers).
158
COVER, supra note 89, at 27.

592

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 3

of that compact and establishes a “natural law obligation to obey . . . the
Constitution.”159 In this way, although natural law rights are retained, positive law
has primacy.
Slavery was contrary to natural law.160 It denied the Black man161 power over
his own body and use of his labor. In fact, appeals to natural law were the tools used
by antislavery groups for expressing moral doubt and concern about slave law.162
The rights enjoyed naturally from God were denied and stolen from the Black man
through slavery. All that was left were the rights and responsibilities delegated to
the Black man by the white man through the positive law of the Constitution. For
the Black man, the Constitution made positive law and natural law one and the same.
By this maneuver, the white man became the god of the Black.
3. Rituals
Rites (rituals) define and maintain the boundaries between the sacred and the
profane. According to Durkheim, rites are rules of conduct that prescribe how
persons must conduct themselves with sacred things.163 Rites are a way for the
profane to become sacred.164 Rites are ways for individual believers to lose
themselves in the group, whereby their personal identities are willingly subsumed
by the group identity. The group matters more than the individual.165 Geertz suggests
that rituals are ceremonies or cultural performances exhibiting beliefs to both
worshipers and outsiders, with each group interpreting the performance
differently.166 It is in rituals where the moods and motivations attached to sacred
things (Geertz calls them symbols) are generated and reinforced by the
worshipers.167 As these moods and motivations are reinforced, the individual
perspectives of the believers fuse into a single worldview of the collective group.
Given the nature of beliefs and rituals, religion is a phenomenon conducted by
a group. According to Durkheim, “[r]eligious beliefs proper are always shared by a
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definite group that professes them and practices corresponding rites.”168 Religion is
an eminently social, collective thing.169 Beliefs belong to the group and unify it.170
In the Religion of Race, the ritual is the adjudication of cases and controversies
pertaining to the status and rights of Blacks in the nation. This adjudication
confirmed the authority of the Constitution and reinforced the beliefs regarding each
race. This is the Ritual of Law. Through decisions, the law maintained the
boundaries between white and Black, the sacred and the profane. Each decision
reinforced the specialness of white freedom and citizenship and defined the group
identity for each race. Courts played an active role in determining who was or was
not white enough to enjoy the privileges accompanying whiteness.171 This
determination, in turn, consistently confirmed the worldview that Blacks were
second-class persons (if any class at all) and were beneficial to the growth of the
nation. Blackstone provides a well-known definition of “law”: “[a] rule of civil
conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a state commanding what is right, and
prohibiting what is wrong.”172 Law is the ritual by which the Supreme Court, as
consecrated personages, divines the Constitution to command the manner in which
the races will maintain the sacredness of whites and prohibit Blackness from
contaminating their purity. Each case, with its briefs, oral arguments, and written
opinions, is a cultural performance for those inside the judiciary, for the other
branches of government, and for the public at large.
The Ritual of Law comprises several principles. Supreme Court justices
interpret the sacred text using these principles as their hermeneutic, which is to say,
through an interpretive lens.173 The initial principles used by the Court in the preCivil War era were carried over from England and were adopted early into the
American legal system.174 These principles are: (1) common law/stare decisis; (2)
federalism; and (3) judicial review. The Ritual of Law requires consistent use of
these principles by the Court in each decision it adjudicates. The ideas and concepts
embedded in the Court’s decisions are concretized each time the ritual of
adjudication is repeated. In this way, racism against Blacks is hardened as whiteness
is continually sacralized.
168
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(a) The Common Law and Stare Decisis
The common law system depends on the inherited body of past decisions by
judges.175 A judicial opinion is designed to persuade the parties and the world that
the decision arrived at is just; that the evidence has been weighed; that the rules of
law have been justly applied; and that the rules of law themselves have been fairly
determined.176 As the past decisions of judges become controlling on future cases, it
is thought that stare decisis (that is, precedence) produces certainty.177 The
supremacy of the single tribunal of the Supreme Court lies in its uniformity in the
interpretation and operation of the powers of constructing the law.178 By relying on
precedence, the Court reduces the challenge of judicial caprice in the lawmaking
process.179
The mechanism of the common law is cumulative, in that a particular case
builds upon the holding and decisions of the previous cases. It is also speculative, as
it strikes new ground and teases out new interpretations of the Constitution. Each
case decided in a particular area of law stands on the ground of previous cases while
also adding its own mark on the law.
(b) Federalism
The Constitution provides checks and balances on the power it delegates
between the national government and state governments. Federalism, the
distribution of governmental authority between state and nation, has several values,
namely, efficiency, promoting individual choice by allowing citizens to move from
one state to another depending upon the laws they prefer, encouraging
experimentation in social and economic matters, promoting democracy, and
preventing tyranny.180
Maintaining the proper balance of national power and state power was the
overarching concern of the Founders and the members of ratifying conventions.181
The Court is tasked with ensuring that the exercise of power by the national
government remains within proper boundaries. This is no easy task, as the
boundaries often shift.
(c) Judicial Review
Although judges were the arbiters of the law, their power was not unfettered.
The basic principle of judicial review is that only the people are sovereign, never the
175
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government, and this principle implies that courts must implement only that law that
was legitimately derived from the people themselves, not from the judges.182 As
such, judicial review is an extension of popular, not judicial, supremacy.183 In the
Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton postulates that judicial review is tolerable
because the instrument, which gives the judiciary its power to check the work of the
legislative and executive branches, also limits what judges may do.184 The
Constitution is their master, and they may not act upon their own will. Instead, their
job is to judge based on the wills of others.185 Eugene Genovese suggests that the
“law acts hegemonically to assure people that their particular consciences can be
subordinated . . . to the collective judgment of society.”186 It denies the right of the
individual to take action based on private conscience when in conflict with the
general will.187 It pits the morality of the law in question against the morality of
obedience to authority.188 The judge may express the immorality of a law but must
still apply the law.189 This is demonstrative of the Durkheim construct in which
rituals tie individuals to the group and unify them. The individual sacrifices personal
will for the benefit of the group.
B. The Development of the Religion of Race
In the first hundred years of the nation, the Ritual of Law developed and
strengthened the Religion of Race. Each new case regarding the status and rights of
Blacks ritualized the sacredness of whites and the profaneness of Blacks based on
the Constitution as the sacred text.
Below is an analysis of the primary cases decided by the Supreme Court
adjudicating provisions of the Constitution related to slavery and the status of
Blacks.190 The cases were decided after the Constitution was ratified but before the
Civil War.
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1. Slave Importation Clause—Groves
The case of Groves v. Slaughter191 indirectly involved the Slave Importation
Clause. The case involved a prohibition on importing slaves into the State of
Mississippi and whether a contract for the sale of slaves was valid.192 Although the
case turned on state law, not federal constitutional law, the Court, in its opinion,
acknowledged the Slave Importation Clause and noted that it was an exception to
the power granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause.193 In a nod to federalism,
the Court also noted that it was a state’s decision whether to allow or prohibit the
importation of slaves.194 Essentially, the Court confirmed the validity of the Slave
Importation Clause and states’ rights regarding the institution of slavery.195
2. Fugitive Slave Law—Prigg and Van Zandt
Prigg v. Pennsylvania196 involved the issue of whether states could prohibit the
capture of runaway slaves in their state. In Pennsylvania, slave captors apprehended
a Black woman believed to be a slave contrary to the law in Pennsylvania prohibiting
the forcible removal of escaped slaves.197 The Supreme Court, led by Justice Story,
ruled that this law violated the Fugitive Slave Clause of the Constitution,198 which
prohibited all states from creating laws impairing the ability of other states to
apprehend slaves. Free states were prevented from lawfully assisting or protecting
runaway slaves.199 More importantly, this decision laid the legal foundation for the
presumption that all Blacks, even those in free states, had the status of slaves.200
Even legally free Blacks were under constant threat of being captured and forced
into slavery.201 Prigg declared that Blacks were not afforded the protection of the
due process of law guaranteed to American citizens under the Constitution.202
The Court’s analysis demonstrates the principles of the Ritual of Law. After
stating the question presented, the Court notes the nature of judicial review and
interpretation of the Constitution.203 Upholding the principle of federalism, the Court
191
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says that the states may not add to acts of Congress.204 It then reviews the
constitutional provisions regarding slavery and acknowledges the compromises over
slavery made by the Founders.205 These constitutional provisions prevent nonslave
states from interfering with property.206 The Court affirmatively states that the
Constitution protects state regimes that authorize a “complete right and title of
ownership in slaves, as property . . . .”207 This statement is notable, as it makes
explicit what is implicit in both the Constitution, the Groves decision, and the
Amistad decision208—the Constitution sanctions slavery. Because the instrument
never uses the word “slave” or “slavery,” the Court exegetes and provides explicit
guidance (although it is doubtful that there was any confusion on this point).
The Court makes another significant assertion. Without the Fugitive Slave
Clause, the nonslave states could have made laws freeing runaway slaves or
instituting certain safeguards to protect free Blacks.209 However, because the
Constitution mandated a duty and responsibility for all states regarding runaway
slaves, the states could do nothing but acquiesce.210 The Court reaffirms the
supremacy of the Constitution—once it speaks, it must be obeyed. Further, once
204
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Congress has the power to enact a certain law under the Constitution, states are
forbidden to enact their own laws on the same matter, especially if those laws
conflict with federal legislative acts or alter the meaning of such acts.
The Court in Prigg also notes that states cannot interfere with the property
rights of owners in slaves, as their property, unless it is to police the slaves.211 The
dual nature of the slave asserts itself. When property, slaves exist for the wealth and
pleasure of their masters, and states must refrain from interfering with a person’s
wealth. When people, fugitive slaves are criminals, and it is acceptable for states to
do what they must to protect the health and safety of whites.
The issue of fugitive slaves came before the Court again in Jones v. Van
Zandt.212 Brought under a challenge to the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, the Court
repeated the holding in Prigg upholding the constitutionality of the act and the
clause.213 Again, the Court noted the provisions of the Constitution and the history
of its creation when acknowledging the primacy of property rights in slaves.214 The
Founders compromised in the Constitution to protect states’ rights in slave
property.215
The case is notable for two reasons. First, using the principle of federalism, the
Court states that the legality of slavery is a political question for individual states;
thus, the Court was not to rule on this issue in accordance with prior case law (that
is, Marbury216). Second, when reciting the history of the constitutional provision
regarding runaway slaves, the Court says that the compromises of the Founders are
“sacred compromises.”217 The Court reaffirms that the denigration of Black people
was a necessary and vital component of the creation story of America and the
Constitution.
3. Citizenship Rights for Three-Fifths Persons—The Dred Scott Decision
The archetypal pre-Civil War case is Dred Scott v. Sandford, known commonly
as the “Dred Scott decision.”218 The Dred Scott decision concerned the citizenship
status of Blacks and implicitly interrogated the Three-Fifths Compromise—whether
people considered less than a whole person have citizenship rights. Dred Scott
served as a slave to his owner for a number of years in states and territories that
prohibited slavery and bringing slaves into the territory. His master, Dr. Emerson,
and his family brought Scott and his family to Missouri. Upon the death of Dr.
Emerson, Scott and his family were given to the widow as part of the estate. Scott
sued in state and federal court, claiming a right to freedom under state and federal
211
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law. The case was complex, with a variety of issues spanning ten years.219 The
central issue of the case, as posed by Chief Justice Taney, was whether a “negro
whose ancestors were imported into this country, and sold as slaves,” can become a
member of the political community such that he is “entitled to all the rights,
privileges, and immunities, guaranteed by [the Constitution of the United States] to
the citizen?”220 Or, as Don E. Fehrenbacher restates it, can Dred Scott, as a free
Black man, be regarded as a citizen of Missouri for the purposes of being eligible to
bring suit in federal court under the diversity citizenship clause?221
The Court definitively asserted that Blacks, freed or enslaved, were not citizens
of the United States. They could claim none of the rights and privileges under the
Constitution.222 This is so, according to Chief Justice Taney, because Blacks were
considered “a subordinate and inferior class of beings,” “altogether unfit to associate
with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior that they
had no rights which the white man was bound to respect.”223 As a separate class of
persons, Blacks were not, and were never intended to be, included as “people of the
United States.”224 Further, the Constitution treated Blacks as property, and it was left
to the states to decide how to deal with the Black race.225
Not all on the Court agreed with Taney’s reasoning. Two justices vociferously
dissented, noting that several colonies treated free blacks as citizens before the
Constitution was adopted.226 They asserted that free Blacks were indeed citizens of
the United States. Justice McLean noted that “[a] slave is not mere chattel. He bears
the impress of his Maker, and is amenable to the laws of God and man.”227
One of the most consequential decisions in the long history of the Court, Dred
Scott v. Sandford, is notable for several reasons. As a procedural matter, the Court
did something unusual when it decided the citizenship question. Although the
question was raised in the lower court, neither party pled the citizenship issue in its
filings to the Supreme Court. Despite this fact, however, the Court reviewed this
issue and justified doing so on the grounds that the parties were bringing the whole
record before the Court, and the Court, therefore, had the prerogative to revisit this
issue.228 Once the Court ruled that Scott did not have standing to bring suit in court,
the Court could have ended its inquiry into the matter and not opined on the other
issues presented. It broke with its custom, however, and proceeded to answer the
219
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other questions. It justified this decision by invoking the power of the appellate court
to correct the judgment of the lower court.229 As the authority, it could break with
its custom when deciding cases.
Substantively, the Court used the history of the country’s founding to rule on
the question of Scott’s citizenship. According to the Court, Africans were not
considered citizens of America at the time of the drafting of the Declaration or the
Constitution.230 They were never part of the political community at the founding and
have always been considered inferior.231 In the Court’s view, it was unfathomable
that Blacks were included in the term “citizen of the United States,” such that they
could avail themselves of the privileges of the court system.232
Further, the Court reaffirmed the Van Zandt holding that the legality of slavery
is a political question, and therefore the Court was not able to consider it (thereby
confirming the importance of stare decisis).233 Moreover, referencing federalism, it
noted that the separation of powers does not allow states to confer U.S. citizenship
upon people.234 This authority is reserved solely for the federal Congress. Using
another previous decision, Strader v. Graham,235 the Court noted that the status of
the slave depended upon the law of original residence and not the state into which
he was brought.
Justice Taney hoped this decision would squash the issue over fugitive slaves
and the peculiar institution embroiling the nation in never-ending controversy and
increasing division.236 He was sorely mistaken. Perhaps his hubris arose from the
fact that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land and his faith that, once the
Court interpreted it, all debate would end. While the law was settled, opinions were
not. Ultimately, the legality of slavery was indeed a political question that could be
solved only by the politics of war.
Many have questioned—both then and now—the Court’s judgment in this case
and have stated that it was wrongly decided.237 Nevertheless, the Court used the
Ritual of Law—stare decisis and federalism—to maintain the boundary between
white and Black, the sacred and the profane. It maintained the belief that whiteness
is sacred because whiteness means freedom. Scott was not allowed to enjoy the
privileges and rights of positive law that would grant citizenship rights to people
living and working within the United States. Instead, his rights were at the whim of
first his master, and then the Court (comprising white men), thereby confirming that
natural law and positive law were one and the same for the Black man.

229

Id. at 427–28.
Id. at 406–07 (majority opinion).
231
Id.
232
Id.
233
Id. at 405.
234
Id. at 406.
235
Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. 82 (1851).
236
Gross, supra note 201, at 310.
237
See generally FEHRENBACHER, supra note 219.
230

2021]

THE RELIGION OF RACE

601

C. Developing a National Civil Religion
With each adjudication, the Supreme Court inculcated the Religion of Race as
a national civil religion. Returning to the concept provided by Bellah in the
Introduction, a key ingredient of a civil religion is the way sacred things are
institutionalized into the collective society.238 When adjudicating Black rights under
the Constitution of 1789, the Court used the three principles of stare decisis,
federalism, and judicial review to reinforce the sacredness of whiteness.239 The
Court also reviewed the history of the Constitution as well as state laws, and
considered the current social conditions of whites and Blacks as part of its decisions.
Each adjudication reinforced the belief system. As lower courts and legislators later
incorporated each decision of the Supreme Court regarding Blacks into their
decisions and laws, the authority of the Supreme Court was reaffirmed and
strengthened. This, in turn, lent ever more legitimacy to the beliefs about Blacks
promulgated by the Supreme Court with each decision.
This process of reinforcing and inculcating the belief system of the Religion of
Race is best exemplified by the example of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850. Many
landowners in the South felt that the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793 was weakened by
the Court’s decision in Prigg.240 Although the Court confirmed the constitutional
requirement for all states to adhere to the Fugitive Slave Clause by not creating laws
that freed or protected runaway slaves, the Court ruled in that case that Congress did
not have the power to require states to enforce the federal law.241 This meant that
while states could not interfere with the recapture of slaves, they were not
affirmatively required to adjudicate fugitive slave cases in their courts or assist in
the hunting or recapture of slaves.242 As there were few federal courts at the time,
slave masters had to incur the cost and time of pursuing runaways slaves on their
own or hiring professional slave catchers.243 Congress addressed the concerns of
southern masters and legislators by enacting the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 as part
of the Compromise of 1850.244 Essentially, the law created a national law
enforcement system for the first time by providing for federal commissioners to be
appointed in every county who were empowered to decide fugitive slave cases with
the attendant power of the state to secure the return of runaway slaves.245 The law
provided harsh penalties (monetary fines and jail time) for anyone aiding fugitive
slaves in any manner, and it included a very low standard for evidentiary proof and
little to no due process for the slaves and freed persons charged with escape.246 This
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law was affirmed, albeit indirectly, by the Supreme Court in Ableman v. Booth.247
The belief that Black people are inferior and worthy to be chattel property owned by
whites came full circle. The Supreme Court had affirmed the belief that Black people
are chattel property to be owned by whites in Prigg.248 Legislators then strengthened
this belief further by creating the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 to demand more
forceful participation by all states and all people in the recapture of slaves, thus
making the institution of slavery stronger.249 The Supreme Court then reaffirmed the
belief of Black inferiority by confirming the 1850 law in Ableman.250 In this way,
the authority of the Supreme Court and the Constitution was reinforced and, along
with it, the belief about Black inferiority.
Another key feature of civil religion is its ability to serve as a tool of social
solidarity, one that unites and orients the polity around a set of beliefs. The best
demonstration that the Religion of Race united and oriented society around the belief
of white supremacy is, interestingly enough, the story of eighteenth- and nineteenthcentury abolitionists. On the surface, abolitionists appeared to reject the notion that
whiteness was sacred, as they called for the emancipation of slaves and the end to
the institution of slavery. Abolitionists, however, were not a monolithic group. They
held different ideas about the speed of emancipation, the nature of the Constitution
and its provisions on slavery, the use of the courts, and the aftermath of
emancipation.251 The last consideration is the most interesting difference. Until the
end of formal slavery, some abolitionists believed in the total equality of the races
and fought for rights for freed Blacks.252 A second group of abolitionists believed
that it was abhorrent to keep another human being in chains, but they did not view
Africans as their equal and were content for freed Blacks to be treated as secondclass citizens with restrictions on their liberty.253 Some of these abolitionists
advocated for “colonization,” which would remove slaves from the country
altogether and create colonies for them overseas.254 Some of the Founding Fathers
ascribed to this belief (as did President Abraham Lincoln).255 The core idea that
unites this second group of abolitionists is the belief that Africans were not fit to be
in the same society as whites. Whiteness was still sacred. These abolitionists
believed in the Constitution, even if they were disappointed with its proslavery
leanings, and they were satisfied using the courts as a means for change. They were
able to separate the status of Blacks as slaves from their status within society. They
ought not to be in chains, but they also should not be one’s neighbor.
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Although many abolitionists rejected the ideas of white sacredness and Black
profaneness,256 the fact that many ascribed to them shows that a civil religion had
taken root. The various groups of abolitionists in the 1800s all sought to end the
practice of enslaving Blacks. However, they displayed varying degrees of
repudiating the Religion of Race, demonstrating the power of this national civil
religion to shape and guide beliefs—even those who fought against slavery still
thought of whiteness as sacred. For Bellah, the unity provided by civil religion
consists of an agreement to subordinate the nation to a set of ethical principles
transcending the nation itself.257 Even as the nation was fraying over the issue of
slavery, the specialness of whiteness was still a salient and ever-present principle.
From the creation of the Constitution until the Dred Scott decision, the majority
of the Court spoke and settled the law so that the belief about the profaneness of
Blacks hardened. By the Civil War, the Religion of Race had developed into the
national civil religion. Whether this national civil religion would continue was
challenged in the aftermath of the war.
III. THE CONSTITUTION OF RECONSTRUCTION
The Dred Scott decision was a catalyst, or at least a significant factor, in igniting
the Civil War.258 It hardened the abolitionist and antislavery advocates’ stance
256
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against slavery and was further proof of the “Slave Power” that had overtaken the
nation.259 On the other side, proslavery apologists were emboldened in their
intransigent belief that slaves were the most important property and that the
prosperity of the South (and perhaps the nation) depended upon slavery.260 The
election of 1860 heralded a new Republican president, Abraham Lincoln, and the
fear among southerners that the federal government would begin dismantling the
slave institution.261 The South seceded, and the Civil War began.262 Lincoln, a
moderate abolitionist at best, began dismantling the institution of slavery with the
Emancipation Proclamation during the war.263 In the war’s aftermath, Congress
continued the work by enacting the Reconstruction Amendments—the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments—as well as the Civil Rights Act of 1866264
and Civil Rights Acts of 1870–75.265 I refer to all of these Amendments and Acts
together as the “Constitution of Reconstruction.”
These Amendments and ensuing legislation forever changed federal power by
augmenting it to safeguard the civil and political rights of Blacks.266 By doing so,
they changed the fundamental belief system of the Religion of Race. These changes
attempted to redefine the entire belief system of the Religion of Race so
fundamentally that they represented a complete rebuff to the Religion altogether. By
elevating the status of Blacks to full human beings with the accordant rights and
responsibilities of whites, the new Constitution attempted to reduce the inferiority
of Blacks and remove the boundary that existed between the sacred and the profane.
This resulted in the dissonance that continues today—namely, whether Blackness
remains profane and whiteness sacred, and whether Blacks will achieve the same
level of citizenship status, rights, and privileges as whites.
This section details the Constitution of Reconstruction and discusses the
Supreme Court’s exegesis of the new Constitution.
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A. Amending the Constitution
In the Religion of Race, authority rests upon the sacred text of the Constitution,
which was created to define and establish the new nation. While this sacred text has
been amended many times, the amendments instituted in the wake of the Civil War
were the most consequential for Black Americans and, therefore, for the nation.
What follows is a description of the Reconstruction Amendments—the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments—as well as the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and
Civil Rights Acts of 1870–75.
1. The Thirteenth Amendment and the 1866 Civil Rights Act
The Thirteenth Amendment formally ended the Constitution’s protection of
slavery:267
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. Congress shall
have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.268
The Emancipation Proclamation (the “Proclamation”) began the work of
ending slavery; however, more was needed for emancipation to affect every state in
the country and become a permanent solution to slavery. Issued on January 1, 1863,
after a preliminary proclamation, the Proclamation emancipated only the slaves in
states rebelling against the United States.269 It did not free the slaves in states
remaining part of the Union, including Delaware, Maryland, Missouri, and
Kentucky.270 Further, the Proclamation was enacted pursuant to the president’s
military powers during war as commander-in-chief. Accepting the argument that
slaves were property, Lincoln claimed the military authority to seize the property as
part of the conquest of war.271 Many in Congress doubted that the Proclamation
would remain law after the conflict was over. If not, then the South might be free to
reinstitute slavery.272 The war, with the Proclamation, wrought military destruction
of slavery. The Thirteenth Amendment brought its legal destruction.273
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The Amendment was introduced in the House of Representatives by James M.
Ashley, on December 14, 1863, a year before the war was over;274 a month later,
John B. Henderson of Missouri introduced the same proposal in the Senate.275 It
went through three debates in Congress, one in the Senate and two in the House of
Representatives, before being passed to the states for ratification.276 The Secretary
of State, William H. Seward, announced the ratification of the amendment on
December 18, 1865.277
The drafters of the Thirteenth Amendment used the natural law principles
advocated by abolitionists when declaring slavery (and involuntary servitude) to be
illegal. For decades, abolitionists had argued for the country to return to the words
of the Declaration of Independence in its proclamation that all men were equal.278
According to Alexander Tsesis, “the Declaration of Independence established equal
liberty as a key national aspiration,” but “[it was] an unenforceable policy that
conflicted sharply with proslavery commitments.”279 “[A]bolitionists adopted
natural rights principles from the Revolutionary generation but decried the
Founders’ willingness to accept inequality for the sake of national unity.”280
Abolitionist principles were influential during the Civil War, as a number of
Republicans began to accept these principles and call for an eradication of slavery
even before the war was over.281 In fact, a number of abolitionists became influential
politicians in the Reconstruction Congress and played a significant part in drafting
and passing the Thirteenth Amendment.282
The drafters of the Thirteenth Amendment were cognizant that they were
amending the most venerated governing document. They did not want to be seen as
overthrowing the Constitution.283 They chose language from older, national sources,
namely the Northwest Ordinance of 1787,284 to honor the Founders while also
moving the country beyond the terrible compromise the Founders felt they had to
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make.285 The Northwest Ordinance was a “touchstone of antislavery
constitutionalism” and “occupied an almost sacred place” in constitutional politics
of the antislavery movement.286 Using the language of the ordinance embedded the
Amendment with the call to natural law that was the hallmark of abolitionists.
For some, the Amendment did not do enough to protect natural law rights for
Blacks. The proponents wanted to “protect the civil liberties of all persons, whites
and emancipated Blacks.”287 Their arguments were based on the “Lockean
presupposition of natural rights and the protective function of government.”288 The
institution of slavery destroyed the natural rights the Constitution was designed to
protect, so abolishing slavery would secure these rights.289 As noted by Black
antislavery advocates like Frederick Douglass, equality between the races required
more than the abolition of slavery.290
This idea was on display in the legislative debates. Eliminating “slavery” was
clarified to mean not just removing people from chains but also destroying the codes
that turned people into chattel. Further, the Amendment was meant to address the
“incidents of servitude.”291 This phrase, first coined by Senator James Harlan of
Iowa, referred to the disabilities that the Amendment was meant to address, as
Harlan saw slavery infecting the privileges of citizenship.292 The Amendment would
empower the federal government to prevent “human rights abuses.”293 As such, the
Amendment would affect not just those who were enslaved but also free Blacks,
who bore the incidents of slavery.294 Additionally, it would also protect whites who
were terrorized for antislavery speech and actions prior to the war and northerners
who were kidnapped, abused, and murdered while traveling in the South.295
By calling upon natural law principles, the drafters of the Thirteenth
Amendment were restoring God qua God for the Black man. The sacred text would
acknowledge the inherent equality of Blacks while also acknowledging positive law.
The interplay of natural law and positive law for whites would now be the same for
Blacks.
The enforcement clause of the Thirteenth Amendment granted power to the
federal government over civil rights—an area that had once been the province of the

285
Oakes, supra note 283, at 123–25. The first part of Article VI of the Northwest
Territory Ordinance reads: “There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the
said territory, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted.” Northwest Territory Ordinance, supra note 284, art. VI.
286
Oakes, supra note 283, at 124–25.
287
BUCHANAN, supra note 271, at 8.
288
Id.
289
Id.
290
Foner, supra note 255, at 69.
291
BUCHANAN, supra note 271, at 11.
292
Id.
293
Id.
294
Id. at 10.
295
Id.

608

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 3

states. By doing so, it forever altered the fundamentals of federalism.296 This was
one of the biggest concerns expressed by the opponents. The Amendment gave the
federal government power to affect more than just freeing forced labor.297 Several
members of the Democratic Party expressed concern about placing Blacks on equal
citizenship footing with whites.298 Blacks now “would be treated the same as other
citizens in voting, holding political office, and serving on juries.”299 The supporters
of the Amendment responded that Blacks “should not be barred from [political]
participation because of racism.”300 Opponents were also concerned with the shift in
relations between the federal government and the states.301 They regarded the
amendment as an “impermissible assertion of federal power,” as Congress now
could enact laws regarding public and private discrimination.302
In the end, the Radical Republicans were successful, and the Amendment was
adopted. It was the first change to the Constitution in sixty-one years.
Unfortunately, this formal end to slavery did not automatically change the
status of Blacks from noncitizens to full citizens with all attendant rights. Using the
Enforcement Clause of the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress created the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 (the “1866 Civil Rights Act”)303 in an attempt to protect civil
rights against state and private interference and prevent Black people from slipping
back into slavery. In a direct repudiation of the Dred Scott decision, the Act declared
all persons born in the United States to be U.S. citizens, without regard to race or
color or previous conditions of slavery or servitude.304 Further, it explicitly granted
all persons the same rights as white citizens, including contract rights, property
rights, and rights to use and participate in the court system, and it stated that all are
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“subject to like punishment, pains and penalties.”305 The Act also stated that persons
who denied these rights on account of race, color, or previous enslavement were
“guilty of a misdemeanor and, on conviction,” faced a “fine not exceeding one
thousand dollars or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both.”306 The Act was
monumental, as it was the first time that United States citizenship was clearly
defined. This law also demonstrated a “new relationship between the federal and
state governments.”307 Before the Act, states had discretion about whether to prohibit
discrimination in any of these areas. This was no longer the case.308
Senator Lyman Trumbull, one of the drafters of the bill that would become the
1866 Civil Rights Act and a drafter of the Fourteenth Amendment, envisioned the
Act as giving effect to the Thirteenth Amendment by securing to all persons within
the United States practical freedom.309 The Amendment and the Act were
appropriate means of safeguarding individual liberty decreed by the abolition of
slavery, and he believed that without them, Blacks would be pulled back into
slavery.310 Eric Foner notes that under the Act, “whiteness,” which was previously
a boundary of exclusion (that is, sacred), was now a baseline of citizens’ rights—a
standard to be applied to all Americans.311
As with the Thirteenth Amendment, there is a natural-rights philosophy
underlying the 1866 Civil Rights Act. Trumbull elaborated by noting that the equal
protection provisions give full expression to natural rights, which must be protected,
lest the purposes of civil society are frustrated.312 The Act was also concerned with
equality of economic opportunity, which was noted as a vital function of the
government.313 Although drafted with the end of slavery and its vestiges in mind,
the Act was designed to protect all races.314 It was not limited solely to action by the
state but was meant to capture the customs and traditions by which individuals
discriminate against others.315
2. The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and Civil Rights Acts
With the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment and the 1866 Civil Rights Act,
Blacks were emancipated and obtained rights of equality on par with whites. This
status remained, however, a fact on paper, but not in reality. Soon after the end of
the Civil War, states in the South began enacting Black Codes.316 The sole purpose
305
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of the Codes was to curtail the freedom of the Black person in order to put Black
people as close to slavery as possible.317 In addition to the Codes, Blacks (and whites
sympathetic to Black rights or showing sympathy for the ideas of the Republican
Party) were the target of unfettered violence meted out by spontaneous mobs or the
Ku Klux Klan.318
It was evident to members of the Reconstruction Congress that the promise and
potential of the Thirteenth Amendment had yet to be realized. The solution was to
enact the provisions of the 1866 Civil Rights Act into an amendment to guarantee
that the citizenship rights so desperately needed by Blacks were concretized into the
political community of the country and not subjected to the whims of the majority
(which was the possibly fatal flaw of the 1866 Act).319 There were, moreover,
concerns that Congress lacked the constitutional power to pass the 1866 Civil Rights
Act, and therefore an amendment was necessary to enforce the guarantees of the Bill
of Rights for all citizens.320
The first and last sections of the Fourteenth Amendment read as follows:321
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.322
317
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While the second through fourth sections of the Amendment are important, most of
the jurisprudence surrounding this Amendment concerns the first and fifth sections. Paul
Finkelman, Original Intent and the Fourteenth Amendment: Into the Black Hole of
Constitutional Law, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1019, 1022 (2014) [hereinafter Finkelman,
Original Intent].
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U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1–5. Sections 2, 3 and 4 read as follows:
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding
Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for
President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the
Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied
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Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.
The Fifteenth Amendment reads as follows:
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude. The Congress shall have power to enforce
this article by appropriate legislation.323
The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments furthered the goals of the Thirteenth
Amendment of putting Black people in positions of true equality and made
permanent the goals of the 1866 Civil Rights Act.324 These Amendments addressed
the more blatant disabilities for Blacks flowing from the institution of slavery.325 By
furthering the goals of the Thirteenth Amendment, these later Amendments
expanded the meaning of the natural-rights philosophy undergirding the Thirteenth.
The Fourteenth Amendment was passed by Congress in 1866 and ratified by
the states in 1868.326 The first line of the Fourteenth Amendment addressed the
outcome of the Dred Scott decision.327 As mentioned previously, the Court in Dred
Scott ruled that Blacks, whether enslaved or freed, could never be citizens of the
United States.328 By stating that any person born in the United States is a citizen, the
Amendment directly repudiates the Court’s decision. Next, the Amendment protects
the privileges and immunities of United States citizens from encroachment.329
Congress generally understood that this meant that “privileges and immunities” were
all rights shared by all citizens of the United States, including those enumerated in
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of
President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States,
or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an
officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or
judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have
engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing
insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State
shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against
the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts,
obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 2, 3, 4.
323
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324
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the Bill of Rights.330 Further, the Amendment protects these rights from being
abridged by the states.331 The Due Process Clause of the Amendment is one of the
most important provisions, as it removed “one of slavery’s most severe disabilities—
the slave’s legal incapacity to attack arbitrary action authorized or mandated by
government.”332 The Equal Protection Clause furthered the protection noted in the
1866 Civil Rights Act.
Congress did not spend much time or energy debating Sections 1 or 5, the
clauses related to citizenship, privileges and immunities, due process, equal
protection, and enforcement.333 The supporters agreed that it would protect the “civil
rights” of Blacks and other races; however, they did not universally agree on the
substantive meaning of the Amendment.334 As Paul Finkelman notes, the idea of
equality between the races was in flux after the Civil War.335 For instance, although
Republicans agreed that Blacks should have citizenship, there was a discussion on
whether citizenship meant enfranchisement for Blacks.336 Further, phrases such as
“equal protection” or “privileges and immunities” were general ideas, but “no one
completely described them, and no votes or reports assented or defined what they
meant.”337
The Fifteenth Amendment was passed by Congress in 1868 and ratified in
1870.338 The denial of the right to vote on racial grounds was seen as an attribute of
slavery, so the purpose of this Amendment was to strongly advance the goals of the
Thirteenth Amendment by removing this badge.339 Republican critics noted that the
Fifteenth Amendment did not provide broad guarantees of the right to vote akin to
universal male suffrage.340 Michael Kent Curtis notes that they “presciently warned
that the Fifteenth Amendment could be evaded by all sorts of methods that
disenfranchised people on a basis other than race (literacy tests, for example)—but
had the effect of disfranchising blacks.”341
As with the 1866 Civil Rights Act, Congress enacted several civil rights laws
pursuant to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to make explicit the
guarantees of the amendments. The Enforcement Act of 1870 was aimed at
330
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332
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protecting the Fifteenth Amendment right to vote.342 The act reached both state
actors and private persons interfering with another’s right.343 Using the authority of
the Fifteenth Amendment as well as the Fourteenth, the Enforcement Act also
reenacted contracting and other legal rights from the 1866 Civil Rights Act.344
The Civil Rights Act of 1871 (the Ku Klux Klan Enforcement Act)345 aimed at
enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment against state actors and private individuals
who used political terror to prevent Blacks and whites from enjoying their rights. It
provided for a civil cause of action and punishment of private actors for criminal
conspiracies to deprive persons of their civil rights.346
Finally, the Civil Rights Act of 1875 (the “1875 Act,” and together with the
Enforcement Act of 1870 and the Civil Rights Act of 1871, the “Acts”) was the last
attempt by the Reconstruction Congress to erase the last vestiges of slavery, which
were racial discrimination in public places.347 The 1875 Act, proposed by Senator
Charles Sumner, prohibited racial discrimination in juries, churches, and places of
public accommodations.348
With these Acts, Republicans overwhelmingly concluded that Congress could
reach private conduct motivated by a specific intent to deprive people of
constitutional rights.349 This belief was based on a variety of theories—equal
protection, the Bill of Rights, protection of less textually explicit civil rights,
guarantee of a republican form of government, and, in some cases, all of these.350
What was clear, however, was that Congress could pass a national statute to address
the private oppression and violence perpetuated against Blacks and others in
attempts to deprive them of constitutional rights.
The effect of the Reconstruction Amendments and Acts was a monumental shift
in the political status of Black people, at least formally. The Amendments changed
the Constitution and thus amended the sacred text. In summary, the Constitution of
Reconstruction abolished slavery, granted citizenship to Blacks, granted the vote to
Black men, ensured Blacks equal right to contract and property, ensured for Blacks
all privileges accorded to whites, and allowed enforcement against the government
and private individuals for any interference of these rights and privileges. The
Constitution transitioned from one protecting slavery to one providing new light for
the treatment of Blacks and their place in the political community of America by
restoring natural law and the rights attendant to it. Blacks were no longer chattel
property but fully human citizens, with all of the same rights and duties as other
342
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citizens. The belief of Black inferiority was to be replaced with the belief of Black
equality.
This new light of the Constitution of Reconstruction would need to be fully
understood and interpreted. It was not long before the Supreme Court was asked to
divine its meaning.
B. Supreme Court Interprets Amended Constitution
Soon after the passage of the Reconstruction Amendments and Acts, the
Supreme Court was called upon to provide guidance and interpret the new sacred
text. During this adjudication, the Supreme Court was dealing with the sensitivity of
politics for the first time after the Civil War.351 It was their role to determine the
exact effect of the drastic shift of the federal-state relationship and the beliefs about
Black Americans.352 G. Sidney Buchanan speculated that the abundance of
congressional legislation passed to raise Blacks to the status of legal equality of
whites reflected a fear that the efforts of Congress would meet judicial opposition.353
1. Initial Cases
Early cases demonstrate that the fears of many were well-founded. In The
Slaughter-House Cases in 1873, the Court completely eviscerated the meaning and
potential of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
refusing to use it to apply most of the protections of the Bill of Rights to the states.354
In United States v. Cruikshank, the Court declined to apply the Bill of Rights to the
states.355 In its first iteration of the state action doctrine, the Court stated that the
Fourteenth Amendment applies to the federal denial of rights and that states still had
jurisdiction over them.356 The Court did show a little mercy to the Amendments later
351
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when it upheld the constitutionality of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the fourth section of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which prohibited
the exclusion of Blacks from jury service.357 A few years later, however, it declared
section 2 of the Ku Klux Klan Enforcement Act unconstitutional in United States v.
Harris.358 It thereby disallowed punishment for private conspiracies to deprive
others of their equal-protection rights. Within eight years, the Court scaled back a
few protections found in the new Amendments and the laws enacted pursuant to
them. It left Blacks vulnerable to deprivation of rights at the state level and the
interference of their rights by private individuals (for example, the Ku Klux Klan).
These initial cases diminished the new laws but left them intact. The Court was
not finished, however. It continued to limit the meaning of the Reconstruction
Amendments. Its decision in two key cases described below best demonstrates its
interpretation of the new Constitution.
2. Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1875—The Civil Rights
Cases
A few years after the enactment of the Reconstruction Amendment (and two
short years after Harris), a challenge was brought to the Civil Rights Act of 1875,
which had been created pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.359 In the Civil Rights
Cases, indictments were brought under the 1875 Act against different individuals
who denied service to Blacks in various public accommodation settings, notably an
inn, a theater, and a railroad.360 The jury at the lower court found in favor of the
defendants, and the suit was appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Court began its analysis with a discussion of the legislative history and text
of the Fourteenth Amendment.361 The Court then established the principle of state
action and provided case support for it.362 According to the Court, the Amendment
357
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provides a limitation on what a state may do to its citizens and is not concerned with
the “individual invasion of individual rights.”363 Furthermore, the Court said the
Fourteenth Amendment is for corrective action against the state and does not
empower general legislation on the actions of individuals.364 It then considered the
Act in terms of the Thirteenth Amendment and stated that denying public
accommodation is not slavery nor a badge of slavery.365 The Court reached this
conclusion by reviewing the history of slavery and describing the incidents of
slavery.366 According to the Court, the Thirteenth Amendment is not about race or
class but about slavery only, while the Fourteenth Amendment does address race and
class but only in terms of what the state may or may not do.367 The Court clarified
that discrimination against individuals by individuals was not in the purview of the
Fourteenth Amendment:
It would be running the slavery argument into the ground to make it apply
to every act of discrimination which a person may see fit to make as to the
guests he will entertain, or as to the people he will take into his coach or
cab or car, or admit to his concert or theater, or deal with in other matters
of intercourse or business.368
For the reasons above, the Court found in favor of the defendants and declared void
the Civil Rights Act of 1875, as the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments did not
provide authority for its passage.
The dissent by Justice Harlan was notable, as it used the principles of law
employed by the Court prior to the Civil War.369 As Taney had done in Dred Scott,
Harlan considered the intent of the law and the constitutional provisions.370 He then
asserted the nature of the separation of powers to argue that the Court should void a
law only when it clearly is not in the legislative power of Congress.371 He described
the history of the relationship between the federal government and slavery.372 He
also used stare decisis to argue that the national government has the power to protect
the rights conferred or guaranteed by the Constitution (citing Prigg and Dred
Scott).373 Using these principles, Harlan would uphold the 1875 Civil Rights Act and
provide relief for the discrimination faced by the Black plaintiffs based on the power
conferred in the Reconstruction Amendments.374
363
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3. Fourteenth Amendment—Plessy v. Ferguson
The infamous case of Plessy v. Ferguson begins with a Louisiana statute
mandating railroad companies solely within the state to separate Blacks and whites
by providing designated rail cars or areas.375 If the races are not kept separate, the
law prescribes fines and imprisonment for individuals and employees of the
offending railroad company.376 The petitioner, Homer Plessy, was of mixed race,
believed to be seven-eighths white and one-eighth Black.377 When he refused to
leave a white car on a train, he was forcibly ejected and imprisoned. He brought a
lawsuit challenging the state’s law as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.378
The Court begins its analysis in the usual manner by discussing the
Amendments at issue with prior case law.379 It restates the holding of the Civil Rights
Cases that discrimination against Blacks is not a badge of slavery, but only an
“ordinary civil injury properly cognizable by law.”380 The Court then counters the
Thirteenth Amendment argument by saying a statute making a mere legal distinction
between the races does not destroy legal equality.381 The Court repeats this sentiment
when noting that the Fourteenth Amendment allows the distinction between social
equality and political equality, while the Amendment is concerned only with the
latter.382 Further, the Court states that separation does not imply the inferiority of
Blacks.383 It then traces the separation of Blacks from whites under various state
laws, particularly those known to be antislavery and more liberal, to argue that
separation of races was acceptable.384 It notes that the question is whether the statute
at issue is a reasonable one in view of the established usages, customs, and traditions
of the people.385
The Court continues the assertion that separation of races does not equate to a
badge of inferiority. It states that the statute in question “stamps the colored race
with a badge of inferiority” only if Blacks choose to put that construction on it.386
Further, legislation cannot overcome social prejudices—only “natural affinities”
will result in equality.387 The Constitution is not responsible for putting the two races
on the same plane.388
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Here again, Harlan has much to say in a dissenting opinion.389 He frames the
controversy as one where the state is putting restrictions on U.S. citizens.390 He
argues that railroads are public highways, and he uses case law to support this
assertion.391 He then discusses the Reconstruction Amendments and the Court’s
adjudication.392 In a notable passage, he gives a real-world meaning to the statute at
issue and states that it keeps Blacks from occupying the same car as whites.393 His
argument is based on infringement by the state of personal liberty.394 He counters
the Court’s argument about reasonability by stating that it is not for the Court to say
whether a law is reasonable but to determine whether it is valid (again employing an
argument based on separation of powers).395 He also counters the idea that law does
not affect social relations. Instead, he believes that separating the races will
profoundly affect the country, as it will lead to race hate.396 Finally, he offers
counterarguments to the Court’s use of prior case law by noting that the cases
discussed were made before the Civil War and Reconstruction Amendments.397 In
essence, Harlan argues, the Court is basing its decision on the “old light” of the
previous Constitution and not the new light of the freshly amended one.
C. Dissonance Created
The outcome of these cases is well-documented, as they instituted the dreadful
era of Jim Crow and the doctrine of separate but equal, by which de jure and de facto
segregation of the races became a societal norm.398 By interpreting the Constitution
389
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of Reconstruction in the manner they did, the Supreme Court not only disregarded
the principles previously used by the Court but also instituted new principles that
would endure to this day. The Court established the state action doctrine, which
determined that constitutional inquiry should focus on whether discrimination
occurred because of the state (that is, the government), rather than focusing on
recourse against private discrimination.399
As keepers of the sacred text, the Supreme Court has the purported
responsibility to correct error when it sees it. It did just that when interpreting the
newly amended Constitution. By enacting the three Reconstruction Amendments
and Acts, Congress was granting (or, from their point of view, restoring) to Blacks
the natural rights proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence for all people.
Through this legislation, Congress was placing Blacks on the same level as whites.
The legislators were restoring god or nature as the giver of rights, and not the white
man. The Court did not fully accept these changes to the belief system at the core of
the Religion of Race and corrected what it perceived as an error. It did so by
maintaining the ascendancy of positive law over natural law. The Court could not
completely override the will of Congress and reinstitute slavery, and thus eradicate
the natural law rights of Blacks. The Court could, however, delegitimize the new
rights to maintain control over Blacks and thus reduce the importance of their natural
law rights.
The next section explores further the dissonance between the ideals of the new
Constitution and the Supreme Court’s adjudication of cases in the aftermath of its
creation.
IV. DIS/CIVIL RELIGION
The Constitution of Reconstruction was a turning point in this country. It was
an opportunity for the words of the Declaration of Independence and the promises
of the Constitution of 1789 to come to fruition. Instead, by maintaining the belief
system of the Religion of Race, the Supreme Court blunted the opportunity for
Blacks to be full and equal members of the community. This is not to diminish or
ignore the fact that the Court has since progressed toward the ideals of the
Constitution of Reconstruction and that Blacks gained more political rights in the
last half of the twentieth century than previously experienced. However, the
optimism inherent in the Constitution of Reconstruction has not been fully
manifested, as evidenced by the current socioeconomic status of Black Americans,
the continued drumbeat of racial discrimination cases brought by Black plaintiffs,
and the disproportionate deaths of Black people at the hands of police officers.400
399
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This section explores the dissonance between the intentions of the
Reconstruction Congress and the Supreme Court’s maintenance of the boundary
between the sacred and the profane, leading to the creation of a contest between the
promised new civil religion and the Religion of Race as a dis/civil religion.
A. The Promise of a New Civil Religion
After studying more than sixty different slave societies throughout world
history, sociologist Orlando Patterson concludes that there are three constituent
elements of slavery, each centered on the power dynamic of domination and
control.401 The first element is the extreme power and coercion used to bring slavery
into existence and then sustain it.402 The second element is “natal alienation,” or the
nature of the slave as a socially dead person who is alienated from all rights and
claims from birth.403 As such, the slave does not belong to any community or social
order.404 The third and final element is the status of slaves as dishonored—they have
no honor because they have no power except through another person, the master;
they are the “ultimate human tool” and “disposable.”405 These elements accurately
describe the American slave system and provide context in helping to truly
understand how the Constitution of Reconstruction was a revolution in the way
people in this nation would relate to one another.
Members of the Reconstruction Congress were very clear that they were
dismantling the economic, political, and social system of slavery and elevating the
Black person to full humanity.406 By creating three constitutional amendments and
related acts, Congress was attempting to reverse the elements of slavery articulated
so well by Patterson. By providing for punishment and consequences against the
state, as well as individual actors, Congress was removing the systematic power and
coercion used against Black people during slavery. There would now be recourse
against those who would act against the will of the Black person. In addition, these
amendments resurrected Black people from the socially dead and brought them into
the fold as citizens with rights and claims. They were now part of the political
community of America. They were no longer tools to be used by another person;
now, because they had power against those who would take their agency away—
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Blacks had honor. These were the lofty ideals embedded in the Constitution of
Reconstruction.
In essence, this newly amended Constitution dismantled the belief system of
the Religion of Race. Black people were no longer property but were acknowledged
as human beings entitled to the same treatment and rights as whites. They would
have control over their own mind, body, and soul. They would have rights to
economic success by and for themselves, consistent with every other person’s ability,
and would no longer be explicitly sacrificed for the wealth of the nation. Unlike the
Constitution of Slavery, the Reconstruction Amendments and Acts do specifically
reference slavery and race. The Thirteenth Amendment refers to “slavery and
involuntary solitude.”407 The 1866 Civil Rights Act explicitly ensures that “citizens,
of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or
involuntary servitude,” shall have the same rights and privileges “as is enjoyed by
white citizens.”408 The Fifteenth Amendment ensures that the rights of all citizens
will not be abridged “on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude”
(which echoes the enforcement provision of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, which uses
the phrases “on account of such person having at any time been held in a condition
of slavery or involuntary servitude” and “by reason of his color or race”).409 By
mentioning slavery and race, the Constitution of Reconstruction acknowledges that
the oppressive institution existed and had a deleterious effect on a portion of the
population. The Constitution of Reconstruction intentionally and clearly rejected the
previous belief system and instituted a new one built on freedom and complete
equality.
B. Supreme Court Maintains Boundaries
Whiteness is sacred because whiteness means freedom. In a new world where
slavery is outlawed, freedom takes a different form. No longer is it the absence of
chains and the ownership of the fruit of one’s own labor. In a postslavery world,
freedom is the full expression of rights as citizens—the ability to speak, transport,
assemble, and transact business in the manner of one’s own choosing. In creating
the doctrine of separate but equal, the Supreme Court limited the freedom of Black
people and created physical boundaries to maintain the sacredness of whiteness and
prevent the profane Black skin from contaminating those spaces. Segregation is not
freedom. As Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. states, “[s]egregation . . . ends up relegating
persons to the status of things.”410 Despite the attempts by the Reconstruction
Congress to elevate Blacks to equal status with whites, Blacks were still objects to
be maneuvered and controlled for the benefit of whites under Court-sanctioned
407
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segregation. As noted previously, Durkheim suggests that sacred things can be
anything that people endow with value and protect from things not sacred.411 In a
real sense, the profane can contaminate or damage the sacred. The sacred is superior
in dignity and power to profane things.412 In the Religion of Race created by the
Founders, then, value was defined by the rights and acknowledgment of citizenship
attached to whiteness. Distance between the races maintained by power and coercion
allowed for this value and uniqueness. Had the Court embraced equality, it would
have removed the distinction between white citizens and Black people and, thus,
removed the barrier between the sacred and the profane. Whiteness would have lost
its value. The Court may have allowed for liberty (albeit limited), but it did not allow
for equality. The Court was not willing to fully eradicate the Religion of Race at that
time.
Congress could have been a check on the Supreme Court when its interpretation
of the sacred text was not in line with the ideals of the new Constitution. Congress
represents the demos, the people, who voiced their will by ratifying amendments to
the Constitution. Given the wide, sweeping changes Congress enacted with the
Reconstruction Amendments and Acts and the passionate debates and speeches in
favor of equality, one could suppose that Congress would amend the acts, if not the
Constitution, to rectify the Supreme Court’s adjudication, which resulted in
maintaining boundaries between whites and Blacks. Indeed, Congress has a history
of correcting Supreme Court decisions, as demonstrated in creating the Fugitive
Slave Law of 1850 to correct Prigg.413 Instead, Congress ceded control and remained
silent. In fact, by the time of the Civil Rights Cases, it was clear that the federal
government was unable or unwilling to halt the widespread violence against Blacks
in the South during Reconstruction.414 In 1876, Republicans, tired of involvement in
southern affairs, negotiated with the Democrats to ensure that the Republican
nominee, Rutherford B. Hayes, would become the U.S. President.415 In return,
Republicans promised that Hayes would withdraw federal troops from the South and
not do anything when Democratic governors took office in several states of the
South.416 This was called the Hayes-Tilden Compromise, and it had a destructive
effect on burgeoning Black equality. Political rights were not protected, and the
economic and social rights of Blacks declined as well.417 Reconstruction politicians
were more interested in reconciling with white southerners than ensuring Black
freedom.418 Congressional leaders were no longer committed to guaranteeing the
promises of the Constitution of Reconstruction by 1883 when the Civil Rights Cases
were decided, and definitely not by the time of Plessy.419 Thus, the decisions of the
411
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Supreme Court went unchallenged, allowing its exegesis to shape the belief system.
This exegesis meant there still needed to be a boundary between the sacred and the
profane—between whites and Blacks.
The Court and Congress both seemed to be invested in moving quickly beyond
the effect and meaning of Reconstruction (and thereby delaying full equality for
Blacks). The work of Norman Spaulding analyzing the evolution of federalism
offers a useful explanation for these actions. Spaulding argues that the Rehnquist
Court interpreted federalism according to principles established in the Constitution
at the nation’s founding but diminished the important shift in federalism resulting
from the Reconstruction Amendments.420 Spaulding posits that the Reconstruction
Amendments are unlike any other changes to the Constitution and are a fundamental
shift in its framework.421 The Amendments rectify the historical injustices of the
original Constitution, namely slavery, and stand as a monument commemorating
those injustices.422 The Court’s adjudication obscured this monumental shift and
represented a “desperate desire to forget what defined the terms of Reconstruction
before it even began.”423 Spaulding calls this desire to forget the “monumental
historical consciousness,” and he defines it as collective memory work “predicated
on forgetting the structural significance of the Civil War and Reconstruction
Amendments.”424
The analytical tool provided by Spaulding is helpful when considering the
Court’s adjudication of Black rights after Reconstruction. Similarly, the Supreme
Court acknowledged the changes brought by the new Reconstruction Amendments
but continued to view relations among the races according to principles the Founders
included in the original Constitution—the Constitution of Slavery. The Court
diminished the effect of the Reconstruction Amendments by instituting the doctrines
of state action and separate but equal,425 while generally curtailing the power of the
Amendments to remove the boundaries between the sacred and the profane. As it
did with federalism, here, too, the Court obscured the radical shift in the treatment
of Blacks memorialized by the Constitution of Reconstruction. It was enough to
420
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mark the injustices of slavery with the Amendments; the Court did not evince a
desire to do the truly hard work of dismantling the belief system. As Spaulding might
say, the Court’s desire to forget showed a “chillingly amnesic” suppression of the
significance of the Constitution of Reconstruction.426
C. Dis/civil Religion
In the immediate aftermath of the Civil War and the newly amended
Constitution, the Court charted a path between the belief system of the Constitution
of Slavery and the ideals of the Constitution of Reconstruction. Because the people
had spoken and changed the sacred text of the original Constitution, the Court was
beholden to the dictates of the prohibition of slavery and the grant of citizenship
rights to Blacks. However, the Court curtailed the protections and gains promised in
the amended Constitution by adding, for instance, the state action doctrine to the
Ritual of Law. By doing so, the Court, as the consecrated personages of the sacred
text, maintained the Religion of Race—with its belief in white supremacy. The Court
transitioned the Religion of Race into a new form of civil religion, which I call the
“dis/civil religion,” as explained below.
Beginning with the Civil Rights Cases, the Court has used the state action
doctrine to distinguish between public discrimination by state actors and private
discrimination by private individuals. This distinction is based on the language of
the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits the abridgment of equal protection
under the law by the state.427 With this in mind, the Court has declared private
discrimination to be permissible as a matter of constitutional interpretation.428
Essentially, with the state action doctrine, the Court provided a private right to
discriminate, as the doctrine requires the Court to examine the status of the actor to
determine whether there has been state action in racial subordination—to wit,
whether there was state action in positioning the rights and status of Blacks below
those of whites.429 A state agent’s discriminatory actions may be determined to be
nongovernmental acts and therefore protected private conduct.430 Neil Gotanda
contends that “[u]nder this racial public-private distinction, public officials
exercising state powers operate according to the rule that race is not to be considered.
In the private sphere, however, race may be considered.”431 This is confirmed in
426
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Plessy, where the Court argued that it is not for legislation or the Court to put the
races on equal footing socially, and the Constitution allows for social
discrimination.432
By limiting the application of the Reconstruction Amendments and Acts, as
well as other civil rights laws, to actions by state actors, the Court maintains the
boundary between whiteness as sacred and Blackness as profane. The status and
treatment of Blacks are allowed to be subordinated to those of whites in private
spheres. The public-private discrimination distinction is itself a boundary
delineating when the sacred will be protected and when it will lose its value by
mingling with the profane. This is proven to be problematic, however, as allowing
there to be a sacred-profane distinction in the private sphere affects equality in other
spheres because the application of rights is inconsistent. The Reconstruction
Congress recognized and understood this problem and tried to eliminate all
discrimination in all spheres by drafting the Amendments and Acts as they did.433
By adopting the state action doctrine, the Supreme Court changed the Religion
of Race from a civil religion into what can be called a “dis/civil religion.” As
described earlier, Durkheim and Bellah posited civil religion as a tool of social
solidarity to unite and orient the polity around a belief system.434 By sanctioning
private discrimination vis-à-vis the state action doctrine, that solidarity is fractured,
as the polity is now oriented around two discordant belief systems. The first is
engendered by the Constitution of Slavery, the Religion of Race, where whiteness is
sacred, and Blackness is profane. The other is engendered by the Constitution of
Reconstruction, the promised new civil religion, where racial superiority is
abhorrent, and equality governs.
This fracturing accounts for the inconsistent and confusing adjudication of
constitutional rights for Black Americans since Plessy. From that time until now, a
large body of law has developed regarding antidiscrimination claims of Blacks and
other racial minorities. The Court gradually dismantled the doctrine of separate but
equal in several Court cases beginning in the late 1930s and culminating in the
Brown v. Board of Education decision, which overturned segregation in education.435
432
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Brown technically invalidated the separate but equal doctrine only as applied to
education;436 however, it was the fire that torched segregation in many different
areas. After Brown, a series of Court decisions invalidated the separate but equal
doctrine in public beaches and bathhouses, buses, parks, public parks and golf
courses, athletic contests, airport restaurants, courtroom seating, and municipal
auditoriums.437 Advances toward the ideal of the Constitution of Reconstruction
continued with Blacks having full status and rights equal to those of whites following
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.438 However, after
the civil rights movement, the story of civil rights is one of advancement followed
by retrenchment, as several key legal victories were followed by narrowing the law
or overturning and nullifying it altogether.439
Critical race theorists and constitutional law scholars have noted the
inconsistent and incoherent adjudication of Black rights since Plessy.440 For
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instance, Justin Collings describes this adjudication as the Court’s engagement with
memory regarding slavery and segregation.441 This engagement, according to
Collings, results in the Court primarily viewing the nation’s past treatment of Black
people as an aberration on an otherwise noble tradition of rights for all (termed the
“parenthetical mode”). Because of this view, the Court often denies the redemptive
power and authority of the Constitution as amended by the Reconstruction
Amendments (as argued by Spaulding), resulting in a constrained expansion of
constitutional rights for Black Americans.442 At other times, however, the Court
operates in a “redemptive mode,” which does acknowledge the power of the
amended Constitution, repudiates past wrongdoing, and sanctions strong judicial
action.443 Thus, there has been an inconsistent adjudication in the Court’s history
since Plessy.
The Religion of Race as a dis/civil religion offers an explanation for this
inconsistent adjudication. It is “dis/civil” because it separates from the redemptive
power of the Constitution of Reconstruction. It does not fully embrace the
dismantling of slavery and all of its related vestiges but seeks, instead, to create new
rituals of law to maintain the sacredness of whiteness. It is not an “anticivil religion”
because it still functions as a way to unite and orient society beyond mere political
commitments.444 Despite this persistence, there are those on the Court, as well as
outside the Court, who seek to dismantle the Religion of Race and fully embrace the
promise of a new civil religion as attempted by the Reconstruction Congress.
Essentially, the period after Plessy, continuing to this very day, can be seen as a
persistent contestation between the dis/civil religion and the promised new civil
religion. Any given session of the Court can see one of these civil religions ascendant
over the other one. The challenge lies in knowing which one is ruling.
CONCLUSION
This Article attempts to offer a framework to better understand the confusion
and anger felt by many regarding the persistent nature of racism in America. Despite
numerous laws and a robust regime for antidiscrimination, white supremacy persists.
This Article tells the story of the nation’s foundational documents and ends with a
discussion of the rocky start of the amended foundation provided by the
Reconstruction Amendments. In future work, I will continue to explore the extent to
which the Religion of Race is established in our law and society. This work will
include a discussion on whether the Religion of Race can be disestablished and, if
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so, the mechanisms and institutions (especially those beyond the Supreme Court)
required for that to happen.
In his dissent in Plessy, Justice Harlan proffered the idea that the Constitution
is colorblind. At first, this idea sounds laudable, as it was a counterargument against
the doctrine of separate but equal. Upon further thought, however, the idea that our
Constitution does not recognize color or race is problematic. The colorblind
approach itself maintains the boundary between sacred and profane, as its
application means there is never a chance to apply equity—programs specifically
aimed at addressing the disparity between white and Black by privileging Blacks.
The past few years have demonstrated that equality is not enough. Under the rubric
of equality, the Court has been able to use colorblindness to perpetuate the
subordination of Blacks. Having the same rights on paper does not equate to fair and
affordable housing, access to healthcare, a criminal justice system that does not
target Black people, and lasting wealth.
Whiteness is sacred because whiteness means freedom. The Religion of Race
is the national civil religion that subordinates Black bodies, Black minds, and Black
souls to whites and white privilege. In a country that is becoming more diverse, and
where nonwhites will become the majority in a few short decades, the central
question is whether the Supreme Court will absolutely embrace the ideals and
redemptive power of the Reconstruction Congress and firmly reject the racism
established by the Founding Fathers. One hopes that the Supreme Court will seize
the opportunity one day soon to fully dismantle this Religion of Race and
successfully fulfill their duty as interpreters of that most sacred text—the United
States Constitution.

